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Smith: Fighting Back: How Students with Disabilities Can Hold Schools Li

FIGHTING BACK: HOW STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES CAN HOLD SCHOOLS LIABLE
FOR PEER-INFLICTED INJURIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Renee Soper was a special needs student at OxBow Elementary
School in Michigan.1
She attended both special education and
mainstream classes outside of the special education program.2 School
officials allowed Renee to walk unattended from her special education
classes to the mainstream classes.3 In 1993, Brandon, a middle school
boy two years older than Renee, led Renee off school property and
kissed her.4 Renee reported what happened to her mother, Lina Soper.5
Lina immediately called Renee’s teacher, Ms. Rombach, and requested
that someone watch both Renee and Brandon to prevent future
problems.6 A year later, before Renee transitioned to Muir Middle
School, Lina met with Renee’s new “educable mentally impaired”
(“EMI”) teacher, Ms. Harmala, and reiterated her concerns about
Brandon.7 Ms. Harmala assured Lina that “we’ll keep an eye on the
children. They’re well supervised.”8 The school placed Renee in Ms.
Harmala’s EMI classroom with ten other students, including Brandon.9
Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1999). Renee was a “mentally
retarded” child who had been labeled “‘educable mentally impaired’ (‘EMI’)” at her
elementary school. Id. The Michigan Administrative Code defines EMI as a person
identified with a developmental rate two to three deviations below the mean intellectual
assessment, standardized test scores within the lowest sixth percentile in reading and
math, lack of cognitive development, and an unsatisfactory academic performance not
based on the student’s social, economic, and cultural factors. Id. at n.1.
2
Id. at 848.
3
Id.
4
Id. “Brandon” is a fictitious name created by the author.
5
Id. Renee also told her mother, Lina, that after Brandon kissed her, he told her that he
was excited for her to start middle school. Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 848–49. Before Renee started at Muir Middle School, Lina and Renee’s teachers
attended an Individualized Education Program Committee (“IEPC”) meeting, during
which the school ultimately concluded that Renee should remain in the EMI program. Id.
at 848. Furthermore, the school determined that Ms. Harmala would implement Renee’s
IEP. Id. Renee was twelve years old but cognitively functioned at the level of a seven-yearold. Id. Her IEPC stated that her “social responsibility and personal independence [are]
still quite deficient for her age.” Id. at 848 n.2.
8
Id. at 849. Lina claimed that she had disclosed both Renee’s history of sexual abuse
and prior incident with Brandon to Ms. Harmala. Id. at 848–49. Ms. Harmala, however,
denied that she knew about the prior incident between Renee and Brandon and also denied
making a statement promising constant supervision while at school. Id. at 849.
9
Id. The EMI classroom had no aide, even though Ms. Harmala had requested one
because of the increasing number of students in her multi-station classroom. Id.
1
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At the beginning of the school year, Lina, with knowledge of Brandon’s
abusive family background, requested that Renee never be left alone
with him.10
On October 6, 1994, Renee told her mother that two boys in her EMI
class had sexually assaulted her in the Muir Middle School EMI
classroom while Ms. Harmala was in the hallway.11 Renee also reported
that Brandon, whom Ms. Harmala had allowed to escort Renee to her
locker, raped her in the classroom after Ms. Harmala left the room for
lunch.12 The boys involved threatened to beat up Renee if she told
anyone about the assault.13 Lina confronted Ms. Harmala and Muir
Middle School’s principal and reported the events to law enforcement.14
After Lina reported the rape, the school district took many remedial
steps, including installing windows to the EMI classroom, placing an
aide in the room with Ms. Harmala, and having an aide on the school
bus with EMI students.15 Criminal charges were brought against
Brandon, but the other two boys were never prosecuted.16
The Sopers filed a complaint in Oakland County Circuit Court
against Ms. Harmala, the Muir Middle School principal, the
superintendent, the school district, and the school board for negligence,
gross negligence, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a violation of Title
IX.17 The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision, rejecting Renee’s § 1983 and Title IX claims.18

Id.
Id. Renee also reported that the two boys had fondled her on the school bus. Id.
12
Id. Renee explained that Ms. Harmala allowed Brandon to assist her to open her
locker. Id. While Ms. Harmala was locking up the classroom for lunch, Brandon then
forced Renee to hide in the back of the room. Id. Once Ms. Harmala had left the room,
Brandon raped her. Id. Brandon claimed the sexual penetration was consensual and the
other boys denied ever fondling Renee on the bus or in the EMI classroom. Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. Ms. Harmala contacted both Child Protective Services and Renee’s mainstream
teachers to inform them of Renee’s allegations and to develop a supervision plan, which
included an escort. Id.
15
Id. at 850. The school also advised Renee, Brandon, and the other two EMI boys
allegedly involved “to attend student counseling sessions concerning how to function
socially with the opposite sex.” Id.
16
Id. Renee returned to school in 1995. Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 850, 853, 855. The Sixth Circuit rejected the § 1983 claim, finding that the
plaintiff did not prove that the defendants violated a constitutionally protected right and
thus were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 853. The court also denied Title IX liability
because of the “prompt and thorough response by school officials to the Sopers’
complaint.” Id. at 855.
10
11
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Consequently, Renee was left without a remedy for the assaults against
her.19
Cases such as Renee’s are all too common.20 Children with
disabilities suffer from foreseeable injuries inflicted by their peers while
they are in school and under the supervision of school officials, yet these
schools and school officials are able to escape liability.21 The current
legal remedies have yet to catch up with reality, and victims such as
Renee are left without any hope of a remedy.22 A change in legal theory
is necessary in order to encourage schools to prevent these injuries and,
if they fail to do so, to compensate those students who fall victim to peerinflicted injury as a result of inadequate school supervision.23
To begin, Part II.A of this Note explains how students with
disabilities are easy targets for victimization by their peers.24 Part II.B
reviews several statutes and causes of action typically utilized by victims
like Renee to attempt to hold a school liable for their injuries.25 Next,
Part III analyzes and critiques the courts’ treatment of victims’ claims
under these statutes and causes of action.26 Finally, Part IV proposes a
solution that utilizes and expands upon the tort theory of negligent
supervision.27 Part IV.A proposes that courts throughout the country
recognize that harm to special education students is foreseeable, as
supported by both the California Court of Appeal’s method of analyzing
the issue, demonstrated by M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School and
Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, and the approach adopted
by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.28 In addition, Part IV.B proposes
that courts also recognize a presumption that schools have a heightened
duty to supervise students with disabilities and that it is reasonably

See id. at 853, 855 (holding that the school was not liable).
See infra Part II.B (reviewing existing case law and other examples of children with
disabilities subjected to peer-inflicted abuse).
21
See infra Part III (noting the general ineffectiveness of the current legal theories).
22
See infra Part III (reiterating that schools and school officials tend to avoid liability
under the current legal theories).
23
See infra Part IV (presenting a model statute and a common law presumption of duty
and foreseeability as the legal theories that can effectively address this problem).
24
See infra Part II.A (demonstrating that children with disabilities are disproportionately
subject to abuse by their peers while in school).
25
See infra Part II.B (exploring various cases in which schools and school officials have
failed to intervene and prevent abuse inflicted by peers upon students with disabilities).
26
See infra Part III (analyzing the current legal theories utilized by victims).
27
See infra Part IV (proposing that courts should view the infliction of injury on special
education students by their peers as foreseeable).
28
See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that courts adopt a method of reasoning similar to the
California Court of Appeals and find that injuries inflicted upon children with disabilities
are foreseeable).
19
20
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foreseeable for a student with a disability, absent such supervision, to be
injured by a peer.29
II. BACKGROUND
Generally, students with disabilities are often the targets of injuries
and victimization at the hands of their peers.30 As a result, victims often
turn to various legal remedies to bring claims against the school officials
who allowed such abuse to occur.31 This section explains several statutes
and sources that can be utilized to remedy the wrong, along with
accompanying case law identifying the success and failures of such
causes of action.32 First, Part II.A discusses how students with
disabilities tend to be easy targets for peer-inflicted injuries.33 Part II.B.1
explores theories of negligent supervision under state tort law.34 Next,
Part II.B.2 discusses causes of action under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.35 Finally, Part II.B.3 examines actions under Title IX of the
Educational Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).36

29
See infra Part IV.B (recommending that courts recognize a presumption of
foreseeability in regards to injuries inflicted upon children with disabilities).
30
See infra Part II.A (discussing how children with disabilities are more prone to
victimization by peers due to perceived differences). For the purposes of this Note, a
“child with a disability” is defined pursuant to the United States Code, which states that a
“child with a disability” is a child
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments,
or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education . . . services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
31
See infra Part II.B (noting some traditional causes of action that are available to
victims).
32
See infra Part II.B (discussing several cases in which victims of peer-inflicted injury
attempt to bring school districts and officials to justice by utilizing some common causes of
action).
33
See infra Part II.A (explaining that students with disabilities tend to be stigmatized and
are disproportionately subject to victimization by peers).
34
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the state tort theory of negligent supervision and
instances where peer-inflicted injuries may violate a school’s duty to adequately supervise
its students).
35
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing § 1983 case law and instances in which victims
attempted to utilize this cause of action in order to hold schools accountable).
36
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Title IX case law and attempts to hold schools liable for
injuries with some sort of sexual element, as well as IDEA case law and attempts to hold
schools liable under the theory that injuries inflicted by fellow students is a denial of a free
and appropriate education).
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A. Children with Disabilities: Easy Targets for Peer-Inflicted Injury
Public schools have become a hostile environment where violence
and harassment are common.37 Nearly one out of every three students
feels unsafe while at school.38 Much of the violence and harassment is
the result of peer-on-peer abuse—a type of abuse that has a significant
emotional and developmental impact on the victim.39 The problem is
37
Robert L. Phillips, Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be Liable for Student to
Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 237, 250 (1995). According to a
recent U.S.A. Today poll, “[m]ost students knew someone who had brought a weapon to
school. Fifty percent said they knew someone who had switched schools to feel safer.” Id.
Additionally, according to an American Association University of Women (“AAUW”)
survey, “[e]ighty-five percent of girls . . . reported ‘unwanted and unwelcome sexual
behavior [at school] that interferes with their lives.’” Id. Others report the same
phenomenon. See Helena K. Dolan, Note, The Fourth R—Respect: Combatting Peer Sexual
Harassment in the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 216 (1994) (explaining that school
sexual harassment poses a unique threat in secondary, intermediate, and elementary
schools because students are both the victims and the perpetrators); Adam Michael
Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun ‘Cause Help Ain’t Comin: The Need for Constitutional
Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L.J. 588, 589 (1993) (noting that it is
becoming increasingly common for students to suffer attacks at the hands of their peers).
For example, Phoebe Prince, a teenager, hanged herself as the result of relentless taunting
and bullying that occurred over a period of three months during and after school hours.
Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers Are Charged After Classmate’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2010, at A14. Further investigation revealed that certain “teachers, administrators
and . . . staff members . . . were aware of the harassment,” yet did nothing to stop it. Id.
Still, as noted by the district attorney on the case, while the inaction of school officials was
disturbing, it was not a violation of any law. Id. Surprisingly, the district attorney did
charge several of Prince’s peers with felony charges including “violation[s] of civil rights
with bodily injury, harassment, [and] stalking.” Id. Eckholm and Zezima explain that
these “charges were an unusually sharp legal response to the problem of adolescent
bullying, which is increasingly conducted in cyberspace as well as in the schoolyard and
has drawn growing concern from parents, educators and lawmakers.” Id.
38
Phillips, supra note 37, at 250.
39
See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment—Interference with an Equal Educational
Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (explaining the
educational and emotional impact that harassment creates). Harassment can have an
educational impact, with victims not wanting to attend school, refusing to speak in class,
finding it more difficult to pay attention, and receiving lower grades. Id. Harassment can
also have an emotional impact, with victims feeling embarrassed, self-conscious, and less
confident. Id.; see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 216 (discussing the frequency and emotional
impact of peer-on-peer sexual abuse and noting that it occurs more often than teacher-tostudent abuse and has more severe consequences); Greenfield, supra note 37, at 589 (noting
that the “long-standing problem” of peer-on-peer harassment ranges from “physical and
verbal abuse, sexual assaults and harassment, stabbings, shootings, and attacks on mentally
handicapped students”). Dolan also explains that nearly all sexual harassment complaints
in schools state that the harassment or abuse took place in public view, yet school
personnel are rarely found to take preventative action. Dolan, supra note 37, at 224. But see
Editorial, Education Poll Results Tough to Put into Play, HERALD-TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, available
at http://www.allbusiness.com/education-training/education-systems-institutions/12839
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heightened for students with disabilities, as they are disproportionately
subjected to injury and victimization by their peers.40 For example, a
thirteen-year old special needs student in Texas was raped twice in one
day by classmates—first in the boys’ restroom, and then again in the
school stairway.41 The school responded by covering up the incident and
telling the victim “to go back to class and deal with the problem.”42 In
Mississippi, a young deaf boy was sexually molested by a classmate on
school grounds.43 The boys were initially separated after the incident;
but soon thereafter, the school was forced to end the separation and the
same classmate again assaulted the young boy.44 In Ohio, an autistic boy
was repeatedly bullied and harassed by several of his peers, including
343-1.html (commenting on lack of funding in public schools today). Commentators often
blame lack of funding for the inadequate training of teachers necessary to prevent violence
in schools. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., WIDE SCOPE, QUESTIONABLE QUALITY: THREE REPORTS
FROM THE STUDY ON SCHOOL VIOLENCE & PREVENTION 7 (Oct. 24, 2010), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studies-school-violence/3-exec-sum.pdf
(explaining that funding and resources are essential to ensure that teachers are properly
trained and that programs are in place to prevent violence).
40
See Bonnie Bell Carter & Vicky G. Spencer, The Fear Factor: Bullying and Students with
Disabilities, 21 INT’L J. SPECIAL EDUC. 11, 20–21 (2006), available at
http://www.forockids.org/PDF%20Docs/Bullying.pdf (noting that various studies
indicate that students with disabilities, particularly those that are visible, experience more
bullying than their non-disabled peers in the form of physical attacks, extreme verbal
aggression, and other threats). This article, which relies on approximately eleven studies,
cites the need for additional research in order to further examine the effects of bullying on
students with disabilities. Id. at 21. It also explains that this type of abuse puts disabled
students at an even further disadvantage to their non-disabled peers in addition to the
already existing disadvantages of most disabilities. Id. at 21–22; see also Kathleen Conn,
Bullying and Harassment: Can IDEA Protect Special Students?, 239 EDUC. L. REP. 789, 789–90
(2009) (discussing how students with disabilities are more likely to be bullied, harassed,
and abused by peers at school); David Ellis Ferster, Note, Deliberately Different: Bullying as a
Denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 43 GA. L. REV. 191, 199 (2008) (“Students with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to
bullying.”); Lauren Lambert, Note, Discrimination and Developmental Delays: A Failing Grade
in the Public Schools, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2005) (suggesting that disabled students
are targeted for acts of violence because they are often unable to speak or effectively
communicate to express their emotions or report abuse). Lambert also explains that there
is hardly any case law in the arena of peer-on-peer harassment of disabled students
because victims often choose not to sue over the all too common instances of abuse. Id. at
553. Lambert further notes that discrimination against disabled students runs rampant and
often goes unnoticed in society. Id. As a result, there has been very little written on the
topic of peer-on-peer harassment of disabled students in public schools. Id.
41
See Karen Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a
Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123, 1123 (1994)
(discussing the facts of the incident). The parents filed the lawsuit against the school
district, school officials, alleged attackers, and their parents. Id. at 1123 n.6.
42
Id.
43
Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
44
Id. at 1300.
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several instances of physical assault.45 School officials not only ignored
the bullying, claiming it was simply part of a disciplinary system where
older students hazed younger students, but they also failed to get the
boy proper medical attention after acts of abuse.46
Rape, molestation, and other forms of abuse are widespread in
classrooms, hallways, and playgrounds across the United States, and
disabled students are commonly the target.47 Mencap, a leading
foundation for learning disability awareness in the United Kingdom,
recently revealed that eight out of ten children with disabilities are
subject to harassment by their peers.48 This disproportionate level of
victimization is due to the fact that, unlike regular students, students
with disabilities may stand out in terms of physical characteristics.49
Students with disabilities may also exhibit a lack of social awareness that
can also make them susceptible to victimization.50 Additionally,
M.Y. ex rel. Yorkavitz v. Grand River Acad., No. 1:09 CV 2884, 2010 WL 2195650, at *1
(N.D. Ohio May 28, 2010).
46
Id. School officials also disciplined the victim for the repeated assaults. Id.
47
See Lambert, supra note 40, at 552–53 (explaining that schools are “obvious and fertile
arena[s] for peer-to-peer harassment” of disabled students).
48
“Don’t Stick It, Stop It!” Campaign Information, MENCAP, http://www.dontstickit.org.
uk/campaign_information.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). Mencap interviewed over five
hundred children and young people with disabilities throughout England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland. Id. The organization came to the conclusion that nearly all of these
children are subject to bullying and abuse because of their disabilities. Id. As such,
Mencap instituted the “Don’t Stick it, Stop it!” campaign to help children cope with the
issue. Welcome to Mencap’s Campaign Against Bullying, MENCAP, http://www.dontstickit.
org.uk/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). A study of fifty-four middle school students
from a suburban Minnesota town compared the number of times disabled students
reported bullying or harassment with the number of times their regular education
counterparts reported the same. Eric J. Carlson, Michelle Crow Flannery & Melissa
Steinbring Kral, Differences in Bully/Victim Problems Between Early Adolescents with Learning
Disabilities and Their Non-Disabled Peers, UNIV. OF WIS.-RIVER FALLS 19 (Apr. 30, 2005),
http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED490374.pdf. Results of the study demonstrated that students
in special education programs experience significantly more incidents of bullying by peers
than children in regular education programs. Id.
49
See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1079, 1090 (2002) (“[O]bservations from daily life show that disability harassment occurs
constantly at school.”); Ferster, supra note 40, at 193 (stating that “[c]hildren with
disabilities, who often stand out due to unique physical and mental characteristics, are
particularly vulnerable” to abuse by their peers); see also Telephone Interview with Corry
Smith, Special Education Resource Instructor, Woodland Elementary School in Gages Lake,
Ill. (Feb. 1, 2010) (explaining that one difficulty of mainstreaming special education
students into regular education classrooms continues to be special education students’
interactions with their regular education counterparts).
50
See Carter & Spencer, supra note 40, at 12 (explaining that students with disabilities
such as “learning disabilities, emotional disorders, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
and physical disabilities often demonstrate a lack of social awareness which may make
them more vulnerable to victimization”); see also Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845,
45
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students with disabilities are stigmatized and frequently referred to by
their peers with derogatory and insulting terms such as “retarded”
because they appear and act differently than other students.51 It is clear
that peers view students with disabilities as easy targets.52
Studies also show that violent, aggressive behavior increases when
school rules and restrictions are unclear, when discipline is lax, and
when teachers fail to effectively monitor students’ behavior or protect
the “weaker students in the school.”53 Thus, it is critical for schools to
adequately supervise students with disabilities to protect them from peer
848 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting a disabled student who was educationally mentally impaired
displayed Down Syndrome-like characteristics when she would inappropriately hug other
children and adults).
51
See Weber, supra note 49, at 1091 (“The word ‘retard’ has become a common insult on
and off the playground.”); Lambert, supra note 40, at 551–52 (explaining the word
“retarded” is socially acceptable in society, particularly in schools, and results in prejudice,
discrimination, and harassment); John C. McGinley, Spread the Word to End the Word,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 2, 2010, 06:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-cmcginley/spread-the-word-to-end-th_b_483157.html (discussing the interplay between use
of the word “retarded” and First Amendment rights). While every American has the right
to use the word, McGinley suggests that the consequences for doing so should be
analogous to using other hateful language, such racial slurs, sexist epithets, and
homophobic terms. Id. He further explains that the r-word is a source of pain that
“demeans a group that is not in a position to defend itself and who . . . never did anything
to merit this kind of derision.” Id. McGinley urges society to use heightened sensitivity
and compassion towards use of the word and to think about “the way we treat, regard and
address the special needs population.” Id.; see also Maria King Carroll, Op-Ed., New Rule: A
Word We Should Despise, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/200903-27/news/0903260596_1_intellectual-disabilities-word-describes (discussing the Special
Olympics’ “Spread the Word to End the Word” campaign, a campaign launched on March
31, 2009 in order to end the use of the word “retard”). Carroll suggests that the “R-word”
should be abolished, as it is an awful term that connotes that a person is defective or
stupid. Id. She also believes that ending the use of this word is a step in the right direction
towards humanizing the world for disabled persons. Id.
52
See Weber, supra note 49, at 1081 (noting that “much disability discrimination is the
overt expression of hostility and the conscious effort to subordinate members of a group
with less power and social standing than the majority” and “[n]owhere is the injury more
common or more severe than in . . . schools.”); Ferster, supra note 40, at 199 (“[Students
with disabilities] often look or act different than their peers as a result of their physical,
intellectual, or emotional impairments, and these characteristics make them natural targets
for harassment.”).
53
Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641, 654 (2004)
(suggesting that if teachers do not intervene, some students may deem this as permission to
continue such attacks); Wayne N. Welsh, The Effects of School Climate on School Disorder, 567
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 88, 89–90 (2000) (stating that perceptions of disorder in
schools has a resultant effect on student behavior); Lambert, supra note 40, at 566–67
(discussing that school officials condone discrimination against disabled students by peers
when they fail to take action). Thus, the school officials themselves can foster an
environment where harassment is seen as acceptable amongst students. Id. at 567.
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abuse, which is reasonably foreseeable to occur.54 Legal remedies should
be available to victims in instances where the school condones such
abuse and fails to protect its disabled students from this harm.55
B. Traditional Legal Remedies Available
When a victim seeks recovery for an injury caused by another
student, courts commonly hold that the school is not liable for the
actions of the offending student because the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply between the school and the student.56 A school
is not the insurer of students’ safety and cannot supervise all students’
activities and movements.57 Still, victims can potentially hold schools
liable if the staff was negligent; for example, a school should be held
liable if the teacher failed to adequately supervise the classroom or
permitted the offending student to commit conduct reasonably
foreseeable to injure other students.58 Many disabled students who
suffer from peer-inflicted injuries at school have attempted to utilize a
variety of statutes and causes of action to hold the schools and school
officials liable.59 Regardless of which claims the disabled student brings,
See Weber, supra note 49, at 1084 (noting that both legal scholars and courts alike have
failed to adequately consider bullying and its effects on students with disabilities); see also
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 652 (emphasizing that the school must be the
source of the solution because the school is the very place where the bullying occurs). In
fact, studies have demonstrated that children “may actually appreciate good supervision
because it creates an atmosphere of safety.” Id.
55
See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 47 (“The prospect of liability will cause school
officials to take more seriously their duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment
and, when it occurs despite their best efforts, to respond promptly with appropriate
corrective/remedial efforts.”); see also infra Part IV (recommending that courts treat the
infliction of injury to special education students by their peers as foreseeable so that victims
of peer-on-peer abuse have a viable remedy).
56
See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of
Higher Learning for Injuries Resulting from Lack or Insufficiency of Supervision, 38 A.L.R. 3d 830,
§ 2b (1971) (stating that respondeat superior does not apply; therefore, liability of schools
can only be found when a school breaches a duty owed to a student).
57
See, e.g., Mirand v. City of New York, 736 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994) (explaining that,
while schools are under a duty to adequately supervise students, they are not insurers of
safety and cannot be expected to supervise or control all of their students’ actions); see also
infra note 66 (discussing a school’s duties and the subsequent limitation on such duties).
But see Frank J. Vandall, Undermining Torts’ Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 30 AM. U.
L. REV. 673, 697–98 (1981) (explaining that tort liability should be placed on the party best
situated to prevent the harm).
58
Korpela, supra note 56, § 5; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing theories of negligent
supervision).
59
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643–44, 658–59 (noting that “[t]he
nation needs a change in its current legal theories,” as many victims are unable to hold
schools accountable under theories of negligent supervision, causes of action under Title
54
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foreseeability is often the central issue.60 Students who are subject to
harassment and assault by their peers on school grounds oftentimes will
have no remedy against the school that allowed the injury to occur.61
The following subsections discuss the different sources of law that
victims have attempted to utilize and several cases in which these
sources have been asserted.62
1.

Causes of Action Under Tort Theory of Negligent Supervision

Students injured by their peers may bring claims under the theory of
negligent supervision by the school.63 Some states, however, shield
schools and school officials from liability at the outset by providing
governmental immunity through tort claims acts.64 In the states that
IX, or constitutional theories, and that even anti-bullying statutes fail to protect students
from such harm); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized).
60
See, e.g., Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
“foreseeability cannot create an affirmative duty to protect” the victim when no custodial
relationship is established); see also infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing how it
is difficult to overcome the hurdle of foreseeability).
61
Phillips, supra note 37, at 257. While the injured student has a right against the peer
that inflicted the injury, this remedy does nothing to ameliorate the school environment
that could allow for future injuries and incidents to occur. Id. at 257–58. The public may
oppose school liability believing that it would increase the costs of schools. Id. at 258.
Section 1983, however, was enacted to prevent this very type of harm—“a deprivation of
federal rights due to local officials’ reluctance . . . to enforce the law.” Id.
62
See infra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized).
63
See Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 280–82 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that the injury to a special needs student was reasonably foreseeable and
that the school was liable under theory of negligent supervision); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista
Union Sch. Dist, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 685–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a school liable
under a theory of negligent supervision for the injury of a special needs student); see also
Todd A. DeMitchell & Thomas Carroll, A Duty Owed: Tort Liability and the Perceptions of
Public School Principals, 201 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6 n.34 (2005) (“In a nationwide study by LRP,
negligent supervision accounted for 43% of the school negligence suits resulting in
awards.”). But see Weddle, Bullying in School, supra note 53, at 682–83 (“Tort theories are
currently so lopsided in favor of schools that there can be no real fear of damage awards for
ignoring best practices in the face of what schools should know is a dangerous and
pervasive problem.”) (footnote omitted).
64
See Daniel B. Weddle, Brutality and Blindness: Bullying in Schools and Negligent
Supervision by School Officials, in OUR PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR
AMERICA’S CHILDREN 385, 387 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319397 (noting that, under many
state tort claims acts, “states shield schools and school officials from liability for negligence
unless [their actions rise] to a level of recklessness or gross negligence”); Julie Sacks &
Robert S. Salem, Victims Without Legal Remedies: Why Kids Need Schools to Develop
Comprehensive Anti-Bullying Policies, 72 ALB. L. REV. 147, 187 (2009) (noting that based on
the “doctrine of sovereign immunity, school districts, as political subdivisions that perform
government functions, are commonly immunized from civil suits for injuries, death, or
property damage allegedly caused by the acts or omissions of the district or its employees”
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allow the negligent supervision cause of action, plaintiffs must show the
existence of the following elements: (1) the school had a duty to
supervise its students; (2) there was a breach of the duty by the teacher
or school; (3) the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the
student’s injury; and (4) the injury resulted in damages.65 Regarding the
first essential element, courts have long held that schools have a duty to
supervise children in their custody, although the scope of the duty may
vary depending on the circumstances.66 The standard of care imposed

and can escape liability from suit); Jill Grim, Note, Peer Harassment in Our Schools: Should
Teachers and Administrators Join in the Fight?, 10 BARRY L. REV. 155, 163 (2008) (stating that
some courts simply dismiss tort claims against a school based on the principle of sovereign
immunity). For example, a Texas court concluded that school personnel were not liable for
their negligence because they were immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987). In Hopkins, an
elementary student that suffered from cerebral palsy was left unsupervised and students
proceeded to push her into a stack of chairs. Id. at 617. She sustained a head injury,
resulting in a mild convulsion. Id. The student was dazed and incoherent, yet the teacher
did not contact the student’s doctors or mother and the student later suffered severe
convulsions on the bus. Id. at 617–18. She was then dropped off at a day care center where
she finally received medical treatment. Id. at 618. Still, the court determined that the
school was entitled to immunity, leaving the victim without a remedy. Id. at 619. The
Eleventh Amendment establishes the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (explaining that, as a result of the
passage of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may not hear a suit against a state
without the state’s consent). This immunity from suit—called sovereign immunity—can be
waived, but the state must unequivocally express its desire to waive its immunity. Id. at 99.
65
See Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 391. Weddle breaks down the
generally accepted definition of negligent supervision, as follows: “(1) The existence of a
teacher-student relationship giving rise to a legal duty to supervise; (2) the negligent breach
of that duty by the teacher; and (3) proximate causation of the student’s injury by the
teacher’s negligence.” Id. Weddle also explains that this definition is not limited to
teachers, but can be extended to all school employees. Id.; see also Todd A. DeMitchell,
Essay: Safety Sensitive Positions and the Duty Owed to Students: From Drugs to Torts, 217
EDUC. L. REP. 789, 798 (2009) (“Public schools owe a duty to use ordinary care and to take
reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students thereby providing a safe school
environment.” (footnote omitted)); Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[a] (discussing peer-inflicted
injuries in school and noting that, “while the cases do not appear to be entirely consistent,
there is authority imposing liability upon school agencies where there was evidence
warranting a finding that the occurrence was reasonably foreseeable and could have been
prevented by adequate supervision”).
66
See, e.g., Mirand v. City of New York, 736 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994) (“Schools are
under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held
liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.”
(citations omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) (explaining the
“duty of [a] person having custody of another to control conduct of third persons” (title
capitalization omitted) and suggesting that schools, institutions that take custody of
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upon school personnel in carrying out the duty is the degree of care that
a person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable duties, would
exercise under the circumstances.67 Additionally, many commentators
and authorities, particularly a recently proposed final draft to the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, have even expanded upon the duty,
suggesting that a school has an affirmative duty to protect students from
children during school hours, should have such a duty). The Restatement states the
following:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of
his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to association
with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from
intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
Id. In addition, comment (a) specifically explains that “[t]he rule stated in this Section is
applicable to . . . teachers or other persons in charge of a public school [or] . . . a private
school.” Id. § 320 cmt. a; Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 392 (explaining
that drafts of Restatement (Third) of Torts section 40 validates the theory that schools have
a duty to adequately supervise students, a duty that includes protecting students from the
tortuous acts of other students). Weddle notes that the duty varies in scope, depending on
“the age and maturity of the children being supervised.” Id. But see DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–202 (1989) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to protect a child
from harm inflicted by the actions of a third party, absent some type of special relationship
or circumstance); Grim, supra note 64, at 164 (explaining that while schools have a duty to
supervise, they do not have a duty to protect their students). Still, she suggests that, as the
Constitution was written before school attendance became mandatory, or even very
common, “[t]he lack of duty for educators to protect students against other students seems
inconsistent now that school attendance is compulsory in every state.” Id. at 163. Grim
also elaborates that there is only so much a parent can do for her child once she enters the
schoolhouse gates, and thus, general tort principles suggest that the official taking custody
of the child should give her the same type of protection that she is being deprived of while
separated from her parent. Id. at 164; Phillips, supra note 37, at 253 (explaining that while
there is an established duty to supervise students, the Supreme Court has yet to determine
that there is a similar duty to protect students from harm of third parties).
67
See 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 502 (2010) (“In other words, the standard of
care of teachers is that of an ordinary, prudent, or reasonable person in such a position
acting under similar circumstances.”); see also Ralph D. Mawdsley, Standard of Care for
Students with Disabilities: The Intersection of Liability Under the IDEA and Tort Theories, 2010
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 359, 359 (explaining that the responsibility of public schools to provide
students with disabilities certain services pursuant to the IDEA “intersects with [the]
schools’ obligation to protect students from harm”). Mawdsley explains that many schools
now have detailed knowledge of a disabled student’s needs and behaviors as a result of the
student’s IEP. Id. This creates an issue as to whether this knowledge affects the duty or
standard of care that the school owes its disabled students with IEPs. Id.
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the risk of harm stemming from the school’s special relationship with its
student.68
To determine whether a school breached its duty to supervise when
a peer or third party inflicts an injury and to satisfy the second and third
elements of a negligence claim, the victim must establish that the
school’s action was (1) the proximate cause of the injury; and (2) that the
school authorities had specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous
conduct that caused the injury.69 In other words, third party acts must
have been reasonably foreseeable.70 The foreseeability requirement is a
difficult hurdle to overcome because courts tend to presume that injuries
inflicted by third parties are generally not foreseeable.71
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a), (b)(5) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005). The
Restatement suggests that a school is in a special relationship with its students, which gives
rise to “a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the
relationship.” Id. § 40(a); see also supra note 66 (discussing the Restatement approach).
69
See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 780 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(“Where . . . the underlying injury is caused by the intentional act of a fellow student, the
‘plaintiff [must] demonstrate, by the school’s prior knowledge or notice of the dangerous
conduct which caused the injury, that the acts of the fellow student[] could have reasonably
been anticipated.”) (quoting Druba v. East Greenbrush Cent. School Dist., 734 N.Y.S.2d 331,
332 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)). Another New York court, using Mirand v. City of New York to
support its decision, stated that
[i]n determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision
has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow
students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently
specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused
injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been
anticipated.
Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
(quoting Mirand, 637 N.E.2d at 266); see also Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[b] (explaining that
defendant schools often utilize these requirements as defenses to liability, as plaintiffs
generally have a difficult time providing proof of these elements). Schools often claim that
the independent act of the perpetrating student, rather than negligent supervision, is the
proximate cause of the injury and that the occurrence of the injury itself was not reasonably
foreseeable. Id.
70
See Doe, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (reiterating that the act of the third party must have been
reasonably anticipated or foreseen); Korpela, supra note 56, § 2[b] (explaining the need for a
victim to prove that the injury was foreseeable).
71
See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 501 (2010) (“[A]n
injury caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act of a fellow student ordinarily will not
give rise to a finding of negligence absent proof of prior conduct that would have put a
reasonable person on notice to protect against the injury-causing act.”); see also Weddle,
Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683 (explaining that issues with foreseeabilty and
causation make it very difficult for these student victims to obtain remedies). But see
Matthew Earhart, Note, Bullying: What’s Being Done and Why Schools Aren’t Doing More, 25
J. JUV. L. 26, 29 (2005) (noting that several school districts and state legislatures have passed
anti-bullying policies and legislation, which suggests that these schools and states believe
that bullying is not only prevalent, but also foreseeable and should be prevented); Lambert,
supra note 40, at 569 (explaining that injuries to developmentally delayed or disabled
68
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Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City School District demonstrates the
difficulty victims face in establishing the foreseeability requirement.72 In
Marshall, the parents of a special education student alleged that the
school negligently supervised their daughter after another student
murdered her on school grounds.73 The perpetrator, a fellow special
education student, made several threats during the year.74 Still, the court
determined that the school district was not liable because, despite the
prior threats against the deceased by the student who ultimately
murdered her, the injury was not foreseeable since the threats did not
sufficiently put the school on notice that the perpetrator was dangerous
and needed extra monitoring.75
On the other hand, some courts, particularly in California, have
demonstrated a new trend in which the injury inflicted upon a special
needs student by a peer is deemed foreseeable.76 For example, in M.W. v.
Panama Buena Vista Union School, the California Court of Appeals held a
school liable for injury to a special education student under a theory of
negligent supervision.77 In M.W., a special education student known to
be a disciplinary threat lured another special education student into a
restroom and sexually assaulted him.78 Teachers and school officials
were unaware this assault occurred.79 Due to “the foreseeability of harm

students at school are foreseeable given their unique characteristics). The safety of disabled
students depends in large part on the school placing them in a safe environment with
adequate supervision. Id. It is reasonable to find injuries to disabled students foreseeable
when supervision is lacking. Id.
72
697 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 396. The student’s murder took place during lunch and occurred outside of the
school building in a wooded area on the school property. Id. at 395.
75
Id. at 396. The court specifically noted that “[a]ctual or constructive notice to the
school of prior conduct is generally required because, obviously, school personnel cannot
reasonably be expected to take guard against all of the sudden, spontaneous acts that take
place.” Id. (quoting Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994)). The
court concluded that the student’s statement to a teacher that he intended to “stick his
girlfriend . . . with a needle and try killing her” did not constitute specific knowledge
necessary for such a murder to have been reasonably anticipated under the circumstances.
Id. Furthermore, the court was “unpersuaded” by the plaintiff’s argument that the school
owed a higher duty of care to the student simply because she was a disabled student. Id.
76
See, e.g., Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 280–82 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that it was reasonably foreseeable that a special needs student would
be vulnerable to injury at the hands of a peer); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch., 1 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 673, 685–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a school liable under a theory of
negligent supervision because the injury inflicted upon a special needs student was
foreseeable).
77
1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 685–86.
78
Id. at 676–77.
79
Id. at 677.
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to special education students, the well-settled statutory duty of school
districts to take all reasonable steps to protect them . . . and the
paramount policy concern of providing our children with safe learning
environments,” the school district was held liable for an injury inflicted
upon a student with disabilities.80
Similarly, in Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, the
California Court of Appeals reiterated that “[g]iven the unique
vulnerability of ‘special needs’ students, it is foreseeable that they may
be victimized by other students.”81 In Jennifer C., the victim was a special
needs student who was sexually assaulted by another special needs
student during a lunch break.82 The court began its analysis by noting
that, while the law in regard to special needs children is emerging, it is
obvious that these students are uniquely vulnerable to threats by their
peers, particularly in an area that the school knew to be hidden from
sight.83 Therefore, the court held the school liable for negligent
supervision, as it was reasonably foreseeable that this victim would be
exposed to harm by a fellow student.84
Nonetheless, success under theories of negligent supervision is still
rare, as most courts, unlike those in California, maintain that injuries

80
Id. at 683. The court further articulated that the school should be held liable because
“[t]he assault occurred on the school’s watch, while the student was entrusted to the
school’s care. It was substantially caused by the school’s indifference toward the dangers
posed by failing to adequately supervise its students, particularly special education
students.” Id. at 675. Still, the dissent in M.W. critiqued the majority’s decision, claiming
that the focus centered on the victim’s status without adequately considering the
foreseeability of the particular type of harm that was inflicted. Id. at 686 (Levy, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also argued that “[t]he majority’s contrary position expands the
concept of duty to the point of essentially imposing strict liability on school districts for the
criminal conduct of any student with a discipline record that includes hitting and kicking
other students.” Id.
81
Jennifer C., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 281. As a preface to the case, the court noted that
[a] “special needs” child, i.e. a child suffering from mental and/or
physical disability, cannot reasonably be expected to take care of
himself or herself. Such a child at public school needs help and
protection. This case illustrates the unique vulnerability of such a
child and the unique responsibility of a school district to such a child.
Id. at 278.
82
Id. at 278. The victim was a fourteen-year-old middle school student with disabilities,
suffering from hearing problems, aphasia, emotional problems, and cognitive difficulties.
Id. The perpetrator, another special needs student whom the victim did not know, led her
across campus to the hidden alcove and committed the assault. Id. While the alcove was
not visible from the school grounds, any person walking past the school would see it. Id.
The assault was reported by a parent walking along the sidewalk past the school. Id.
83
Id. at 280.
84
Id. at 280–82.
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inflicted upon special education students by peers are not foreseeable.85
Furthermore, some states prevent negligent supervision claims at the
outset by shielding local government bodies from liability under state
tort law.86 When local bodies are immune from tort law, students
injured at school have attempted to bring statutory claims to recover
damages.87
2.

Causes of Action Under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Section 1983 was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 and has been expanded upon ever since its passage.88 The purpose
of § 1983 is to provide a means of redress for individuals harmed by state
actors.89 The first step in any § 1983 claim is to identify the constitutional
85
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining that foreseeabilty is a difficult
element for a plaintiff to prove and that most courts reject the premise that peer-inflicted
injuries are foreseeable).
86
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing issues of sovereign immunity
and tort claims acts that bar claims of negligence against school and school officials).
87
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing statutory claims under § 1983).
88
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Phillips, supra note 37, at 238. Section 1983 was originally
passed as part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services,
436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978). Congress passed it with little dispute, so the legislative
history is scarce. Id. Even though there is limited legislative history, the Supreme Court
has concluded that one reason that Congress passed § 1983 was to afford individuals
deprived of a federal right to a relief in federal courts when states or state officials are
unwilling or unable to enforce the law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled
in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978). Despite being passed in
1871, § 1983 was essentially dormant for nearly a century until the Supreme Court, in
Monroe v. Pape, held that § 1983 allowed plaintiffs to sue state officers for damages for
actions taken “under color” of state law. Id. at 187. Although the Monroe Court gave an
expansive interpretation to the phrase “under color of state law,” the Court still concluded
that a municipality is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 191 n.50, 192. In
1978, however, the Supreme Court overruled this conclusion in Monell v. Department of
Social Services when it held that a plaintiff may sue a municipality or other local
government unit pursuant to § 1983. 436 U.S. at 690–91. The Court made clear, however,
that a municipality cannot be held liable unless the action that resulted in the alleged injury
was done pursuant to official custom or policy. Id. at 691. Furthermore, the municipality
cannot be held liable solely based upon the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of
its employees. Id. Nevertheless, in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the Supreme
Court declined to expand § 1983 to hold states or its agencies liable under § 1983. 491 U.S.
58, 66–67 (1989). Therefore, if a plaintiff can prove that a school district is not a state actor
or arm of the state, then the school may be subject to liability under § 1983. Phillips, supra
note 37, at 242.
89
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute states that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.
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right that was allegedly infringed.90 While it may sound simple,
bringing a § 1983 claim has been analogized to “walking through a mine
field: [plaintiffs are] uncertain where to step next.”91 Plaintiffs often use
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides
that states shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law,” as the source of law under which to bring a
§ 1983 claim.92 No matter what theory the plaintiff pursues, in order to
prevail the plaintiff must show a direct link between the policy or
custom in question and the alleged injury.93 For peer-on-peer injuries, it
is often difficult to show causation sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim
because the injury is inflicted by another student, not the school or
school official.94 To compound the causation problem, the Supreme
Court has held that the government has no affirmative duty to protect
citizens from private actors.95 Likewise, nothing in the language of the
Due Process Clause itself requires states to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasions by private actors.96 The Due
Process Clause is a limitation on states’ power to act, not a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security.97
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that causation problems can be
overcome because there are particular situations in which “the
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and
Id. In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting
under the color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446
U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The first step is to identify the specific constitutional right infringed.
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (explaining that the plaintiff must allege a
violation of either federal statutory law or constitutional law); Phillips, supra note 37, at 238
(“Section 1983 jurisprudence is so complex that essential elements of a . . . claim are easily
overlooked.”). Aside from the sentence provided in title 42 of the United States Code,
“Congress has given little guidance for section 1983 civil rights claims. Thus, the meaning
of section 1983 elements [has] been promulgated by the courts.” Id. at 243. The courts have
interpreted the elements of the claim to require a person, acting under color of the state, to
cause a deprivation of rights. Id.
90
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
91
Phillips, supra note 37, at 266.
92
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 249 (explaining that
section 1983 cannot be used simply for a general injury, as it “is limited to deprivations of
federal or constitutional rights”). In peer-on-peer violence, it is common for victims to
“claim a [constitutional] violation of bodily integrity.” Id.
93
Phillips, supra note 37, at 248.
94
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort.”); see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 248 (explaining the
difficulty of holding a school liable under § 1983 for the act of a third party).
95
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–202.
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protection with respect to particular individuals.”98 The exception is
applicable in two specific situations: (1) circumstances in which the State
has taken a person into full custody against his or her will, thus creating
a “special relationship;”99 or (2) circumstances where the State has
created the injury or harm, commonly known as the “state-created
The Supreme Court addressed the special
danger” exception.100
relationship exception in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services.101
In DeShaney, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to protect a child from
harm inflicted by the actions of another, absent some type of special
circumstance.102 DeShaney involved a § 1983 action brought by the
mother of a boy who had been beaten by his father.103 The mother filed
Id. at 198.
Phillips, supra note 37, at 253 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–99, 201 n.9).
100
See Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 910–11, 912–13 (6th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that a plaintiff can succeed in a § 1983 action by proving a “special
relationship” existed between the victim and the school or school officials or, alternatively,
by proceeding under a “state-created danger theory”).
101
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198–202.
102
Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 252–53 (explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in DeShaney focused on the premises that if the state wanted the Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) to be liable, it could have created a system under tort law to allow for
such suits; and that if DSS had acted too quickly, the boy’s father could have argued it was
a violation of his Due Process rights). But see Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002)
(upholding a suspicionless school drug testing policy under the premise that a school’s
interest in preventing drug use and establishing an environment conducive to learning
outweighs a student’s interest in privacy). In Earls, the Court contended that “[a] student’s
privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for
maintaining discipline, health, and safety.” Id. at 830. The Court further noted that to
secure order in school and create an environment conducive to learning, “the school has
the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children.” Id. at 831 (quoting
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). In Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld a school drug testing program that authorized
random urinalysis sampling of student athletes. 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995). The Vernonia
Court emphasized that the school’s custodial authority over students permits a “degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.” Id. at 655. The Court
further stated that an “educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren.” Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339). Earls and Vernonia suggest that the
Supreme Court is more inclined to protect students from drug use than it is to protect
students from physical abuse of others.
103
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93. DSS received several notifications about the abuse, and
after the boy was admitted to the hospital with injuries inflicted by his father, DSS entered
into an agreement with the father to allow him to take the boy home under certain
conditions. Id. A DSS caseworker made several visits to the home, observed several
suspicious injuries, noted that the boy was not placed in school as the father had agreed to
do, and noted that the father had still not complied with the agreement. Id. Then the father
beat the boy so ruthlessly that he suffered severe brain damage that rendered him
98
99
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the claim against the social workers and local officials who had received
numerous complaints about the abuse but refused to remove the boy
from his father’s custody.104 The Court found that the State was not
liable, even though it knew about the father’s abuse, because it did not
create the harm and did not restrict the boy from acting on his own
behalf.105 It elaborated that no special relationship existed between the
State and the boy simply because the State had knowledge of the
DeShaney’s rule and exceptions have had important
abuse.106
implications in the public school context, as courts often cite DeShaney as
controlling precedent to deny that the special relationship or statecreated harm existed, even though it is a child-welfare case.107
a.

The DeShaney Special Relationship Exception

There is a very narrow class of people who stand in a “special
relationship” with a state.108 Public schools are under no constitutional
obligation to protect school students from the actions of private parties

profoundly mentally disabled. Id. at 193. Nonetheless, the Court held that the state
officials could not be held liable. Id. at 203.
104
Id. at 193.
105
Id. at 201. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the government
played no role in creating the dangers faced by the young boy and further the government
did not make the child more vulnerable. Id.
106
Id.
107
Phillips, supra note 37, at 253. “Courts have been reluctant to extend the special
relationship doctrine to public schools.” Id.; see also, e.g., Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
28 F.3d 521, 528–29 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the DeShaney special relationship doctrine
before holding that a school had no affirmative duty under § 1983 to protect a student
killed by random gunfire in its parking lot after a non-mandatory school dance); Graham v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994–95 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding no custodial
relationship exists between schools and students; thus, a school district has no affirmative
duty to protect students from other students, even if the school had warnings of threatened
violence).
108
Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006). In Teague,
the court explained that in order “[t]o secure liability against the state for private harm
under section 1983, plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the narrow class of
exceptions to the DeShaney rule.” Id. In Walton v. Alexander, the Fifth Circuit declined to
find a special relationship where a deaf student had been sexually abused by a peer at his
Mississippi school. 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The plaintiff was attacked
twice and sued the superintendent under § 1983 for failure to protect. Id. at 1299–1300. The
court found the school owed the plaintiff no duty to protect him from third party harms.
Id. at 1300–01; see also Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 182 (noting that even though schools
have a substantial amount of control over students in their custody during the school day,
most courts refuse to find that a special relationship is created as a result of this custody).
Sacks and Salem also note that “[c]ourts likewise reject application of the state-createddanger exception because administrators’ failure to intervene in harassment is not the same
as actively encouraging pre-existing behaviors.” Id. at 182–83.
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absent a special relationship between the student and school.109 The
applicability of the special relationship doctrine in the public school
context is a question left open by DeShaney.110 Victims assert that
compulsory school laws and in loco parentis standing create a special
relationship between the school and student falling within the DeShaney
exception.111

109
See, e.g., Teague, 185 F. App’x. at 357 (asserting that the plaintiff failed to state a proper
§ 1983 claim, as neither a special relationship nor a state-created danger existed as required
by DeShaney); Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the student did not state a viable § 1983 claim because there was no special relationship
formed between the student and the school); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729,
732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the school had no duty to protect its students under
DeShaney and that the school was not liable under § 1983); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the premise
that the school could be held liable under § 1983); Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 53
F. Supp. 2d 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Total and exclusive custody, not mere restraint, is at
the heart of a due process claim relying upon a special relationship.”); see also Conn, supra
note 40, at 791 (stating that the consequences of the courts’ failure to find the existence of a
special relationship between a school and students, as well as the courts’ failure to find any
type of state-created danger, unless the harm is so severe that it shocks the conscience of
the court, have led to several harsh decisions); Laura Oren, Some Thoughts on the StateCreated Danger Doctrine: DeShaney is Still Wrong and Castle Rock is More of the Same, 16
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (noting that out of twenty-one recent appellate
cases, only two survived the state-created danger test).
110
Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522, 1523, 1526–27 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an eightyear old deaf student who resided at the Georgia School of the Deaf had a special
relationship with the school, but that the school officials were entitled to qualified
immunity because the law on what constitutes a special relationship was not clearly
established); see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 228–29 (discussing the application of the
special relationship doctrine following DeShaney and noting that the DeShaney Court did
not provide definite guidance). Most courts, nonetheless, decline to find a special
relationship between a student and an ordinary public school. Id. Still, there is a trend for
courts to find that residential schools, schools that maintain custody of students during the
week and provides for students’ basic needs, have an affirmative duty to protect students.
Id. at 231.
111
See supra note 109 (providing an overview of cases where victims were unable to
prove the requisite special relationship); see also Conn, supra note 40, at 790–91 (suggesting
that causes of action under § 1983 are typically ineffective); Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at
182–83 (noting that despite schools’ substantial control over students, courts generally
reject § 1983 claims); Alison Bethel, Note, Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an
Affirmative Duty to Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 183, 185–86
(2004) (noting “the majority view that schools do not have an affirmative duty under the
Due Process Clause to protect students from harm by other students.”); Grim, supra note
64, at 164 (arguing that because school attendance is compulsory in every state, it makes
little sense that schools do not have a duty to protect their students from injuries inflicted
by other students). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a), (b)(5) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1 2005) (“An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of
reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship. Special
relationships [give] rise to the duty [of reasonable care within the relationship of] a school
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Victims argue that compulsory school laws, which require students
to attend school and hold students in class against their will, create the
type of special relationship prescribed by the DeShaney standard.112 The
state arguably cultivates a special relationship with the child by
compelling a child to attend school.113 Students are unable to walk off
the school’s premises during school hours without permission, which
with its students.”) (internal numbering system omitted). In addition, the comment (l)
asserts that
[t]he affirmative duty imposed on schools in this Section is in addition
to the ordinary duty of a school to exercise reasonable care in its
operations for the safety of its students. The relationship between a
school and its students parallels aspects of several other special
relationships—it is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor who
opens the premises to a significant public population, and it acts
partially in the place of parents. The Second Restatement of Torts
contained no Section that specifically identified the school-student
relationship as special. However, a generally ignored passage in § 320,
Comment b, which imposed an affirmative duty on custodians to
control third persons, observes that the custodial relationship is also
applicable to schools and their students.
Despite the Second
Restatement’s limited treatment of affirmative duties by schools, such
a duty has enjoyed substantial acceptance among courts.
Id. § 40 cmt. l.
112
See, e.g., Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376 (finding that no special relationship existed
between the student and the school).
113
See Davis, supra note 41, at 1135 (expanding upon the argument for finding a special
relationship between a school and student under the compulsory education argument).
According to Davis, the most logical conclusion is that when a school maintains custody of
a student, the school should be required to act reasonably and protect the student from
peer abuse. Id. Furthermore, Davis suggests that if parents cannot be certain that their
children will be watched in school, then the parents are failing to fulfill their legal and
moral duties to supervise by sending the children to school each day. Id. In Doe v. Taylor
Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit once elaborated upon this idea, stating that
[p]arents, guardians, and the children themselves have little choice but
to rely on the school officials for some measure of protection and
security while in school and can reasonably expect that the state will
provide a safe school environment. To hold otherwise would call into
question the constitutionality of compulsory attendance statutes, for
we would be permitting a state to compel parents to surrender their
offspring to the tender mercies of school officials without exacting
some assurance from the state that school officials will undertake the
role of guardian that parents might not otherwise relinquish, even
temporarily.
975 F.2d. 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 987 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Dolan, supra note 37, at 236 (arguing that
compulsory school attendance should be recognized as a special relationship because
similar to foster care, the state’s affirmative act of requiring school attendance places a
significant number of children in state approved schools). Students during the school day
rely on the school to provide a reasonably safe environment, a basic need recognized in
DeShaney. Id. at 237.
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prevents students from removing themselves from dangerous
situations.114 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) of Torts specifically
lists “a school with its students” as an example of a type of special
relationship.115
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit rejected a claim by a special
education student who was sexually assaulted and raped by a fellow
student because “[p]ublic school attendance does not render a child’s
guardians unable to care for the child’s basic needs,” and no special
relationship exists between the school and the student.116 In Doe v.
Hillsboro Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit refused “to hold that
compulsory attendance laws alone create a special relationship.”117
Among the many courts that have also considered the issue of whether a
special relationship exists due to compulsory school attendance laws,
nearly all have refused to find that such a relationship exists.118 Most
courts conclude that attending an educational school program for seven
hours a day is not similar to the restraints imposed by prisons and
mental institutions, both of which currently are sufficient to establish the
existence of a special relationship.119

114
See Dolan, supra note 37, at 236 (advocating for the position that schools have
sufficient control over students under compulsory attendance laws for courts to find a
special relationship between the student and school).
115
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(b)(5).
116
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993). In Dorothy J., a
mentally retarded student was sexually assaulted and raped by another special education
student in the school shower. Id. at 731. The student brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that
the school, as a state actor, failed to protect him from assault. Id.; see also Phillips, supra
note 37, at 260 (explaining that guardians are the primary care providers for children and
no affirmative duty is assumed by the school).
117
113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In Hillsboro, the Fifth Circuit denied the
claim of a thirteen-year-old who was raped by a school janitor as it found no special
relationship existed between the student and the school. Id.
118
See, e.g., Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732–34 (noting the fact that a child must attend public
school does not make a child’s guardian incapable of caring for the child’s fundamental
needs); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir.
1992) (en banc) (holding that there was no custodial or special relationship created because
the parents, not the state, remained the student’s primary caretaker).
119
Hillsboro, 113 F.3d at 1415; see also Russell v. Fannin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576,
1582 (N.D. Ga. 1992) aff’d without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The key concept is
the exercise of dominion or restraint by the state. The state must somehow significantly
limit an individual’s freedom or impair his ability to act on his own before it can be
constitutionally required to care and provide for that person.” (quoting Wideman v.
Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (11th Cir. 1987))). But see Pagano ex
rel. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing a
duty of protection based on the special relationship doctrine between elementary school
students who are required to attend school and the school they attend). The Pagano court
allowed the claim to go forward based on the special relationship doctrine that had been
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Alternatively, victims contend that under the in loco parentis doctrine,
school officials have undertaken a parental duty to oversee students in
school, therefore creating a special relationship.120 The in loco parentis
argument essentially is that the school has been given authority via state
compulsory education laws, and therefore should be responsible during
the school day while it maintains custody of the children.121 The
argument requires courts to consider the particular circumstances to
determine whether there was an affirmative duty, specifically focusing
on the school’s control and the child’s dependency and vulnerability.122
Proponents argue that schools have functional custody because when a
student is in school, his ability to protect himself is restricted, as is his
parents’ ability to intervene and protect him.123 When a school acts in its
parens patriae capacity in caring for students, the school’s duty to the

previously recognized in cases of institutionalized persons, incarcerated individuals, and
foster care situations. Id.
120
See, e.g., Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s assertion that a special relationship existed based on the school’s in loco parentis
status).
121
See Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (explaining the in loco parentis argument).
122
See Dolan, supra note 37, at 234 (explaining that the factors that should be considered
by the courts to determine if a special relationship exists include the following: how
vulnerable and dependent the student is at the time, whether the state has compulsory
attendance laws, how mature the student is at the time, and the amount of discretion the
school has in controlling the students); Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (discussing factors
which weigh in favor of finding a special relationship under the theory of in loco parentis).
123
See Dolan, supra note 37, at 234 (comparing institutionalized persons and incarcerated
individuals with school children as all are unable to protect themselves or provide for their
own basic needs). Public school children are in an environment at school where the state
exercises some control over their liberty. Id. at 235–36; see also Grim, supra note 64, at 160
(finding irony in the Court’s findings that a custodial relationship exists between mental
patients and hospital officials, as well as between prisoners and prison officials, but not
between students and school officials). A custodial relationship exists when individuals
are held against their will such that the state interferes with the individuals’ ability to
protect themselves. Id. Students are in a similar situation due to compulsory school laws.
Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 37, at 256 (noting that the primary argument for finding a
special relationship under the in loco parentis theory is that schools maintain control over
their students). Weddle reflects on the competing interests that result in the irony when he
states that
[w]hile there is something disturbing about the fact that the state
can compel children to attend school yet not incur a duty to protect
them from their peers, the Court’s approach actually makes a good
deal of constitutional sense. . . .
On the other hand, such a formulation ignores the significant
disability placed upon school children, . . . [as they] must remain in the
school where the torment is carried out, and the parents can do
nothing to shield [them] from torment.
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666.
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students should increase because the school stands in the place of the
parents and also acts as a part of the government.124
Most courts determine that teachers have the authority to act in each
child’s best interest but have no duty to do so.125 The reasoning for not
finding a special relationship under in loco parentis is that the parents, not
the State, remain the student’s primary caretaker.126 For example, in D.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, the Third Circuit held
that school officials were not liable for the violent sexual assaults
repeatedly inflicted upon a hearing-impaired student by her peers
because her parents remained her primary caretaker; as such, no special
relationship with the school existed under the in loco parentis theory.127
b.

DeShaney State-Created Danger Exception

A second exception to the DeShaney standard occurs where the
government created or enhanced the risk of harm.128 Several courts have
recognized the state-created danger theory and established liability in
cases where a state’s own affirmative actions work to the plaintiff’s
detriment.129 In Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. School District of the City of
Lambert, supra note 40, at 567–68. Courts must begin to recognize that the special
relationship doctrine should apply between disabled school children and the schools they
attend. Id. at 568. If courts do not acknowledge the application of this doctrine, students
with developmental delays and mental impairments essentially have no defense against
the frequent harassment and abuse against them. Id.
125
E.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir.
1992) (en banc). The court noted that even though the student was required to attend
classes and the school officials could exercise discipline over the student, “the
school . . . did not restrict D.R.’s freedom to the extent that she was prevented from meeting
her basic needs.” Id. at 1372.
126
Id. at 1373. In Middle Bucks, the high school student victim, who suffered from hearing
problems and related communication problems, alleged that fellow students frequently
forced her into the bathroom and physically and sexually abused her. Id. at 1366.
Accordingly, the student brought a § 1983 claim, asserting that the school should have
taken action to correct the situation as the teacher should have been in the classroom
during the alleged incidents or should have heard them taking place. Id.
127
Id. at 1373. The Third Circuit rejected the in loco parentis theory for liability, stating
students are not sufficiently restricted from seeking help outside the school on a daily
basis. Id. at 1372.
128
See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the school did not enhance or create the danger); Maxwell ex. rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist.,
53 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“If a state actor creates a danger which harms an
individual or renders him or her more vulnerable to that danger, although the state actor
does not actually harm the individual the state actor may be held to have violated the due
process clause.”).
129
See Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff
could maintain a constitutional claim by alleging that the police chief, a close personal
friend of the man who killed his wife and her daughter, stopped the police officers from
124
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Philadelphia, a Pennsylvania district court accepted a student’s § 1983
claim under the state-created danger theory of liability.130 In Maxwell,
two students attacked and raped a special education student while a
substitute teacher, aware of the events that were transpiring, failed to
intervene to stop the attackers.131 The court held the school district and
teacher liable under the state-created danger test because the harm was
foreseeable, the teacher acted in willful disregard of the victim’s safety,
and the school district and the teacher directly placed the victim in
harm’s way.132
Conversely, in Teague v. Texas City Independent School District, the
Fifth Circuit held that the state-created danger theory was inapplicable
where a peer assaulted an eighteen-year-old Downs Syndrome student
enforcing a restraining order issued in response to the wife’s complaints); Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 596 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding the state liable for injuries caused by a
rape when a trooper impounded a woman’s car and left her to find her way home on foot).
But see Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1374 (holding that the school defendants did not create
plaintiff’s peril or increase the risk of harm to make the student more vulnerable to the
assaults as sexual abuse from inadequate supervision was not foreseeable). Davis suggests
that the court in Middle Bucks got it wrong. See Davis, supra note 41, at 1141. In 1989 when
Middle Bucks was decided, educators might have been able to argue that sexual assault was
not a foreseeable consequence of inadequate supervision. Id. Today, however, in light of
the significant evidence and news regarding peer-on-peer abuse, it is difficult to assert that
sexual abuse in the classroom is unforeseeable. Id.
130
Maxwell, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 792–93. In Maxwell, the court noted that during the day in
question, the victim was unable to exit the room because the defendants had locked the
door to the classroom. Id. at 789. Furthermore, the substitute teacher charged with
supervising the students sat idly while watching the events occur. Id.
131
Id. When the students became disruptive, the teacher explicitly stated to the students,
“I don’t care what you do as long as you do not bother me.” Id.
132
Id. at 792–93. The Maxwell court followed the Third Circuit four-part test for the statecreated danger basis for liability, as adopted in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 792. Under this test, liability is found if:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3)
there existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff;
[and] (4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity
that otherwise would not have existed for the third party’s crime to
occur.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d. at 1208). The Maxwell court first
concluded that the rape was in fact a foreseeable and direct result of the substitute’s
actions, as she had knowledge that the two perpetrating students had assaulted a different
female student earlier that morning. Id. In addition, the court found that, in light of the
teacher’s statement to the class that she did not care about their actions so long as she was
left undisturbed, and because she sat idle while the assault occurred, the teacher acted with
willful disregard for the victim’s safety. Id. at 793. Next, the court determined that the
victim was also a foreseeable plaintiff because the teacher knew that she had been attacked
previously. Id. Finally, the court found that the state created the opportunity for the attack
when the school locked the door to the classroom and the teacher explicitly told the
students that she would neither watch nor control them. Id.
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in the bathroom between classes, as the school did not have actual
knowledge of the risk and did not disregard any excessive risk.133 This
case demonstrated that, to some extent, the special relationship duty
considers the age and maturity of the child involved.134 While the lower
court initially ruled that a special relationship existed between the school
and a cognitively disabled student, it vacated this finding upon learning
the victim functioned at the level of a thirteen-year-old.135
Despite the holding in Maxwell, courts generally refuse to impose
§ 1983 liability upon schools as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision
in DeShaney.136 Courts consistently determine that compulsory school
education laws do not change parents’ status as a child’s primary
caretaker and schools have no affirmative duty to protect their

133
Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006), aff’g 386 F.
Supp. 2d 893 (S.D. Tex. 2005), vacating in part 348 F. Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Tex. 2004). In
Teague, a special education student was sexually assaulted by another student in the school
bathroom between classes. See id. at 357 (referring to facts delineated in Teague, 386 F.
Supp. 2d at 894). The student’s parent brought suit alleging that the school violated the
student’s constitutional rights and should be held liable under § 1983. Id. The court noted
that in order “[t]o secure liability against the state for private harm under section 1983,
plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the narrow class of exceptions to the
DeShaney rule,” which includes either the special relationship exception or the state-created
danger exception. Id. Initially, the district court in Teague denied the school’s motion to
dismiss because the pleadings left room for finding that a special relationship existed
between the plaintiff and the school. 348 F. Supp. 2d at 798. Later, the district court
granted summary judgment to the school finding no special relationship between the
plaintiff and the school. Teague, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 896. Consideration of all the evidence,
including uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiff functioned at the level of a thirteenyear old, still led the court to conclude that no special relationship existed. Id. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Teague, 185 F. App’x at 357.
134
Teague, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 896 n.1 (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412,
1415 (5th Cir. 1997)).
135
Id. at 896. The age of thirteen, whether functional or cognitive, was insufficient for the
court to override precedent and find a special relationship existed, even in conjunction
with compulsory attendance laws. Id.
136
See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that no
special relationship existed and rejecting the victim’s § 1983 claim); D.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the
argument that a special relationship had been formed due to the compulsory attendance
laws and rejecting a § 1983 claim); see also Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (noting that it is
difficult to shock the judicial conscience); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 670
(“[T]he trend has been for courts to reject [the state-created danger exception] even in the
face of seemingly egregious conduct on the part of school officials.”); Bethel, supra note 111,
at 189 (stating that, “according to the court, [a] state’s requirement that children receive an
education does not restrict students’ freedom to the extent that they [or their parents] are
unable to meet their own basic needs;” and as a result, there is no affirmative duty to
protect students from harm).
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students.137 As a result, victims have continued to search for other
causes of action to hold schools liable, including Title IX or the IDEA.138
3.

Other Attempts at a Cause of Action: Title IX of the Educational
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act

Alternatively, victims of peer-inflicted injuries have attempted to use
Title IX as an available remedy against schools.139 Actions under Title IX,
however, are automatically limited in scope to gender-based abuse or
injuries, such as crimes involving a sexual element.140 Title IX states that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”141 Nevertheless, even if the victim can
prove that the injury is gender-based, the threshold to establish liability
is very difficult to meet.142 In Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County
Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that a school district could be
liable for acts of sexual abuse and harassment by a student if: (1) the
school had knowledge of the abuse or harassment; (2) the abuse or

See supra note 136 (reiterating that schools have no duty to protect students).
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims under Title IX and the IDEA).
139
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (creating an exception where schools potentially can be held
liable under Title IX); Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114,
1119 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that if a school engages in egregious conduct that is severe,
pervasive, and offensive, it can be held liable under Title IX); Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben,
195 F.3d 845, 854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (contending that Title IX may support a claim for
student-on-student harassment).
140
See Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of Title IX and a New “IDEA”: Why Bullying Need
Not Be “A Normal Part of Growing Up” for Special Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 1, 3 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has yet to endorse the idea of a same-sex
harassment cause of action for more common forms of bullying under Title IX . . . .”); Susan
Stuart, Jack and Jill Go to Court: Litigating a Peer Sexual Harassment Case Under Title IX, 29
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 245 (2005) (explaining the complicated nature of bringing a Title
IX claim and warning that “courts are loathe to hold schools liable for sexual harassment
under Title IX under any circumstances”).
141
§ 1681(a).
142
See Ferster, supra note 40, at 203 (“The deliberate indifference standard is criticized as
establishing a barrier to relief from all but unconscionable action or inaction by school
officials.”); see also Secunda, supra note 140, at 8–9 (clarifying that in order to establish
actionable misconduct, the victim must establish “three elements: (1) that there was an
‘appropriate person’ with the ability to take corrective action; (2) who had actual
knowledge of the harassment; and (3) who responded with deliberate indifference to that
knowledge”) (citations omitted). This standard establishes difficult hurdles for victims to
defeat in order to establish school liability. Id. at 9.
137
138
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harassment was severe, pervasive, and offensive; and (3) the school was
deliberately indifferent to the victim’s injuries.143
Post-Davis, courts continually reject claims for peer-inflicted injuries
brought under Title IX unless the school acted in a clearly indifferent
manner.144 For example, in Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, the court rejected
the special education student’s Title IX claim based on the student-onstudent sexual harassment that occurred on school grounds.145 Similarly,
in Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the Tenth
Circuit dismissed a Title IX claim where a special needs student claimed
that she was subject to numerous counts of sexual harassment and injury
at the hands of her peers.146 The court explained that the school had
neither been deliberately indifferent nor acted “unreasonabl[y] in light of
the known circumstances.”147 Thus, to prevail under Title IX, a victim
143
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. In Davis, the parent of a fifth grade student sued the school,
pursuant to Title IX, alleging that her daughter repeatedly had been sexually harassed by a
fellow student. Id. at 632. The student had reported each episode to her mother and to the
teacher, and the teacher told the mother that the principal had been informed of the
harassment. Id. at 633–34. Nonetheless, no action was taken against the alleged harasser
and the behavior continued for several months until the student was charged with sexual
battery for his actions. Id. at 634. The Court noted that a Title IX claim “will lie only for
harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Id. at 633. Furthermore, the
Court stated that a school could only be held liable if it “intentionally acted in clear
violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent” to the harassment. Id. at 642.
144
See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text (providing examples of post-Davis
courts rejecting students’ claims).
145
See Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
because the victim failed to prove both that the school had actual knowledge of the
harassment and that the school was deliberately indifferent to the abuse, she did not have a
viable Title IX claim); see also supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text (delineating the facts
of Soper).
146
Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir.
2008).
147
Rost, 511 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648). In Rost, the mother of a special
needs student filed suit against the school under Title IX, alleging that the school had
actual knowledge of the ongoing sexual harassment and was deliberately indifferent to the
numerous reports of such activity. Id. at 1118. The student had been coerced into various
sex acts with a number of her male peers, beginning as early as the seventh grade. Id. at
1117. The boys would threaten to show naked pictures of her at school and spread rumors
about her promiscuous behavior. Id. The mother of the student claimed the school had “a
custom of acquiescing to student-on-student sexual harassment and created a dangerous
educational environment.” Id. at 1118. Even though it was undisputed that the student
specifically told the school about the sexual harassment in question, the court still held that,
because the school had not been deliberately indifferent or acted “unreasonabl[y] in light of
the known circumstances,” it could not be liable. Id. at 1121. Specifically, the principal was
not charged with such deliberate indifference because he claimed to have believed that
these events were not taking place on school property, and thus he was under the
impression that there was nothing he could do about it. Id. at 1121–22.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/8

Smith: Fighting Back: How Students with Disabilities Can Hold Schools Li

2011]

Holding Schools Liable for Peer-Inflicted Injuries

769

must prove the school engaged in egregious conduct, acted indifferent,
and the harassment was “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.”148
Alternatively, disabled students who have been injured by peers
have attempted to bring claims under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”).149 The IDEA was enacted with the goal of
providing all children with disabilities a “free appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”) in the least restrictive environment.150 If a school
violates a child’s right to such an education, a parent can request a
formal due process hearing and seek relief in the form of compensatory
education or tuition reimbursement.151 Only when the parent has
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; see Secunda, supra note 140, at 13–14 (reiterating this exacting
standard).
149
See Conn, supra note 40, at 792 (noting that some believed that the IDEA could prove
“to be an ancillary or alternative path to holding American school districts accountable for
protecting special students from harms and abuses at school”); Secunda, supra note 140, at
16 (explaining that when a special education student is bullied or injured by a fellow
student, the victim could potentially bring an IDEA-based § 1983 claim); Ferster, supra note
40, at 211 (suggesting that victims can attempt to avoid the exacting standard of deliberate
indifference by instead asserting a violation of the IDEA and a deprivation of any
meaningful educational benefit).
150
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006). As guaranteed by the statute,
The term “free appropriate public education” means special
education and related services that—
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (noting that the Education of the
Handicapped Act, which was the precursor the IDEA, “represent[ed] an ambitious federal
effort to promote the education of handicapped children”); Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 361
(explaining that the IDEA also contains a Least Restrictive Environment (“LRE”)
requirement that mandates that students with disabilities be educated with regular
education students “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5)(A))). As a result of this requirement, many students with disabilities will be
educated in regular classrooms with regular education students, often leaving disabled
students at risk for harmful interactions with their regular education counterparts. Id. at
361–62.
151
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6) (discussing the opportunity for a person claiming an alleged
violation of the IDEA to bring a complaint). The Court in Rowley also discussed the
remedies available based on the statute when it states that
[c]omplaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at “an
impartial due process hearing,” and appeal to the state educational
agency must be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or
regional level. Thereafter, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and
decision” of the . . . hearing has “the right to bring a civil action.”
458 U.S. at 182 (citation omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(2), (c), (e)(2)).
148
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exhausted all of these administrative remedies can they seek judicial
review in state or federal court.152 Moreover, in Board of Education of
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, the
Supreme Court held that a student must show that the school’s actions
denied her any meaningful benefit from her individualized educational
program (“IEP”)153 in order to assert a denial of a FAPE.154 Still, it has
20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(6); see also Conn, supra note 40, at 797 (discussing cases
demonstrating the importance of exhausting such remedies prior to bringing suit and
noting that “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies can be fatal to violation of IDEA
claims”).
153
458 U.S. at 203–04. The United States Code defines the term “individualized
education program” as follows:
The term “individualized education program” or “IEP” means a
written statement for each child with a disability that is developed,
reviewed, and revised in accordance with this section and that
includes—
(I) a statement of the child’s present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance . . .
....
(II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including
academic and functional goals . . .
....
(III) a description of how the child’s progress toward
meeting the annual goals described in subclause (II) will be
measured . . . .
(IV) a statement of the special education and related services
and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to the
child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program
modifications or supports for school personnel that will be
provided for the child . . .
....
(V) an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child
will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class
and in the activities described in subclause (IV)(cc);
(VI)(aa) a statement of any individual appropriate
accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic
achievement and functional performance of the child on State and
districtwide assessments consistent with section 1412(a)(16)(A) of
this title . . .
....
(VII) the projected date for the beginning of the services and
modifications described in subclause (IV), and the anticipated
frequency, location, and duration of those services and
modifications; and
(VIII) beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect
when the child is 16, and updated annually thereafter.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(VIII).
154
In Rowley, a student with hearing impairments brought a claim against the school
district, asserting that the school denied her a FAPE by failing to provide her with a sign
language interpreter. 458 U.S. at 184. The school had prepared an IEP for the deaf student,
152
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been difficult to establish that a student with disabilities has been
deprived of any real benefit of an IEP due to an injury inflicted by a peer;
as a result, plaintiffs often fail to meet the requirements for a successful
claim under the IDEA.155
As demonstrated, many students with disabilities suffer from peerinflicted injuries at school.156 As such, these victims attempt to use a
variety of legal statutes and causes of action to hold these schools and
school officials liable.157 Yet, while some victims have been successful in
developing these different sources of law, many victims continue to be
left without a remedy.158

suggesting that she be placed in a regular classroom, use a hearing aid, receive assistance
from a tutor for the deaf an hour a day, and receive assistance from a speech therapist three
hours a week. Id. Rowley’s parents, however, wanted her to be provided with a sign
language interpreter for her classes instead of the assistance proposed by the school. Id.
The Court concluded that to maintain a claim of a denial of a FAPE, the victim must assert
a denial of any meaningful benefit under the student’s IEP. Id. at 203–04. The Court noted
that in passing the IDEA, Congress only desired “to bring previously excluded
handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and to require the
States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and
instruction for each child.” Id. at 189. Because at the time of enactment of the IDEA, “one
million [out of nearly eight million disabled children in the United States] were ‘excluded
entirely from the public school system’ and more than half were receiving an inappropriate
education.” Id. Congress simply intended to provide access to public education to these
children. Id. at 192. As such, the Court emphasized that Congress did not impose “any
greater substantive . . . standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”
Id.
155
See, e.g., R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014, 2007 WL 552117, at *4
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2007) (holding that despite a school’s repeated failure to combat
constant harassment of a disabled student by his non-disabled peers, the school was not
liable because the victim’s parents had “failed to exhaust their administrative remedies”).
In R.P, the victim was a mentally impaired student who was born with a congenital heart
disease. Id. at *1. Due to his mental impairments, the student was subjected to various
violent assaults by his non-disabled classmates, including being confined in a dog cage,
force-fed dog feces, and sexually assaulted. Id. As a result of these assaults, the victim’s
parents alerted school officials, who assured them that their son would be safe at school.
Id. The victim’s therapist also contacted the school in order to establish a plan to help him
return to school. Id. Despite the school’s alleged efforts to ensure the student’s safety, the
harassment and ridicule continued. Id. Nonetheless, the court ultimately dismissed the
complaint because the parents settled with the school prior to the scheduled hearings
despite having begun the administrative process by filing two due process complaints. Id.
at *4. The court concluded that “settling the claims prior to the hearing does not, ‘rise to the
level of an exhaustion of administrative remedies.’” Id. at *4 (quoting S.A.S. v. Hibbing
Pub. Sch., No. Civ. 04-3204JRTRLE, 2005 WL 1593011, at *3 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005)).
156
See supra Part II.A (emphasizing that students with disabilities are disproportionately
subject to victimization by peers).
157
See supra Part II.B (explaining the traditional legal remedies utilized).
158
See supra Part II.B (reviewing the relevant cases in which special education victims
brought suit against schools for injuries inflicted by peers).
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III. ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that many children with disabilities suffer from
peer-inflicted injuries while under the supervision of school officials,
most schools are able to escape liability from suit.159 This Part explains
the strengths and weaknesses of the causes of action that victims attempt
to utilize to hold schools accountable and how most of these options are
doomed to fail.160 In addition, this Part critiques the analyses of several
courts that considered the issue of peer-inflicted injuries.161 First, Part
III.A critiques the theory of negligent supervision under state tort law,
describes its successes and failures, but ultimately concludes that it is the
most likely avenue for success.162 Next, Part III.B assesses the lack of
effectiveness of causes of action brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and policy reasons for and against finding a special
relationship between a school and its students.163 Finally, Part III.C
evaluates courts’ treatment of actions brought pursuant to Title IX of the
Educational Amendments Act of 1972 and under the IDEA.164
A. The Costs and Benefits of Causes of Action Under Tort Theory of Negligent
Supervision
While theories of negligent supervision have statistically been
proven to be one of the most effective means of legal remedy, there are
still many obstacles that a victim must overcome before successfully

See Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 151 (noting that the law is inadequate both in
terms of deterring peer-to-peer harassment and providing the victims any sort of redress);
Secunda, supra note 140, at 3 (“[L]egal remedies for victims of bullying continue to be
woefully inadequate.”); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643 (“The nation
needs a change in its current legal theories.”). Many victims are unable to hold schools
accountable under theories of negligent supervision, causes of action under Title IX, or
constitutional theories, and that even anti-bullying statutes fail to protect students from
such harm. Id. at 658–59.
160
See infra Part III (discussing the strengths and weakness of the traditional legal
remedies available to students who are victims of peer-inflicted injuries, and how, in many
cases, schools and school officials are able to completely escape liability).
161
See infra Part III (commenting on the reasoning of several courts’ decisions regarding
peer-inflicted injuries).
162
See infra Part III.A (discussing the state tort theory of negligent supervision and
critiquing the hurdles that a victim must overcome in order to hold a school liable under
this theory).
163
See infra Part III.B (critiquing the flaws inherent in courts’ reasoning on § 1983 claims).
164
See infra Part III.C (discussing claims under Title IX and the IDEA and the difficulties
of successfully bringing a claim under these statutes).
159
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holding a school liable.165 These obstacles include the issue of states
granting schools and school officials immunity from suit, the difficulty in
proving that the school’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury, and the difficulty in establishing that the injury was in fact
foreseeable.166
1.

Sovereign Immunity Issues

First, some courts may be forced to dismiss tort claims against school
officials, who are state actors, based on principles of sovereign immunity
stemming from the Eleventh Amendment.167 Some states opt for
immunity from claims brought by victims for injuries inflicted by their
peers under the rationale of protecting the state from paying out huge
awards in damages and avoiding the opening of the floodgates of
These state interests in sovereign immunity are
litigation.168
169
Funds available to public schools are limited to begin with
legitimate.
and should not be drained.170 Still, it is a well-settled theory of torts
“that accident losses should be placed upon the party who is in the best
position to prevent the injury.”171 In this case, schools are the best party
able to prevent the injury through adequate supervision.172 Providing
165
See DeMitchell & Carroll, supra note 63, at 10–11 n.34 (noting that negligent
supervision claims consisted of forty-three percent of negligence suits against schools that
resulted in awards).
166
See infra Part III.A (discussing the obstacles many victims of peer-inflicted injury face
in their pursuit to hold schools liable).
167
See supra note 64 (discussing the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
issues).
168
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683; see also, e.g., Yanero ex rel. Yanero v.
Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 527 (Ky. 2001) (holding that the local school board was entitled to
governmental immunity); Carr v. Salem City Schs., 48 Va. Cir. 84, 84 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999)
(holding that the school board was entitled to sovereign immunity).
169
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683.
170
See Phillips, supra note 37, at 258 (“Public perception, whether accurate or not, is that
expanding school liability will increase the cost of schools.”); Editorial, supra note 39
(reporting that in 2009 nearly thirty-two percent of Americans perceive that lack of funding
is the biggest problem facing public schools).
171
Vandall, supra note 57, at 697–98. Vandall discusses the area of products liability and
contends that statutes of repose, which bar suit by a victim after a certain number of years,
ignore the policy of prevention by placing the loss on a victim who is often unable to
prevent the injury. Id. at 698. This is analogous to issues of sovereign immunity in schools,
which also ignores the policy of prevention by placing liability on disabled students for
injuries inflicted by peers. Like victims injured by defective products, disabled students
are often unable to prevent injuries.
172
See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 6 (asserting that teachers are among those bestpositioned to prevent harassment); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 686
(suggesting that courts and legislatures are uncomfortable placing additional
responsibilities on overburdened and underpaid teachers). Yet, “children are being
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schools with unlimited liability from suit ignores the policy of
prevention by oftentimes placing the loss on the victim, a disabled
student, who is unable to prevent the injury.173 When a state chooses to
insulate its schools and school officials from liability, presumably guilty
parties can escape liability by meeting a minimal burden of proof.174
Proponents for state immunity also cite the need to protect school
officials from the fear of constant lawsuits.175 While it is logical to shield
these officials from suit for being unable to control unpredictable and
unforeseeable injuries, these injuries are not unforeseeable—nearly all
students with disabilities are subject to harassment by their peers.176
Providing immunity for schools and school officials merely “solves one
problem at the expense of another and protects adults at the expense of
the most vulnerable children.”177 Furthermore, providing immunity
does nothing to encourage schools to adequately address issues of safety
concerns, especially those surrounding children with disabilities.178 At
the very least, the threat of tort liability encourages schools to take these
issues more seriously and to be more careful at the outset.179
brutalized on a daily basis,” and arguably it must stop. Id. at 687. Weddle also asserts that
schools and teachers are in the best position to prevent such injuries and should be held
liable for failure to intervene. Id.
173
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 686–87 (explaining the school is best
able to prevent the injury).
174
See, e.g., B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 573–74 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that the
Virginia doctrine of sovereign immunity barred any action against teachers for simple
negligence, and that the victim was only entitled to damages if the jury could conclude that
the teacher’s actions constituted gross negligence); see also Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at
187 (“States that follow variations of this doctrine have made it difficult for victims to sue
districts or employees for damages resulting from the negligent supervision of student
bullies or the negligent enforcement of student conduct rules.”).
175
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 683.
176
See Campaign Information, supra note 48 (concluding that eight out of ten disabled
students are subject to bullying and abuse because of their disabilities); see also supra Part
II.A (discussing how students with disabilities are easy targets for peer-to-peer abuse).
177
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 687. Weddle continues:
Characterizing the result in that way is in some ways unfair and in
some ways exactly accurate. It is not the protecting of teachers and
administrators that is deplorable; the alternative could cripple
education. It is the failing to protect the children that cannot continue
if the nation is to take seriously its obligations to them.
Id.
178
See id. at 683 (suggesting that principles of state immunity do nothing to influence
schools or officials to actually prevent the harms in the first place, which really should be
the number one priority in this situation).
179
See Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 190 (explaining that because the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is likely to shield schools from liability for peer-inflicted injuries,
advocates must come up with creative solutions, including helping schools design
preventative policies).
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The Proximate Cause Issue

Another area where courts are hesitant to rule in favor of a victim is
the proximate cause element.180 Courts are reluctant to hold school
districts liable for a student’s injuries when the injuries are inflicted by a
peer or third party because they typically find that such injuries are a
superseding act that severs the proximate cause.181 It is important that a
school be free from liability for unforeseeable actions of a third party.182
Nevertheless, simply because the injury is inflicted by a third party does
not signify that the school was not culpable in its actions.183 When a
school has been negligent and failed to supervise disabled students—
students who studies show typically need protection from peers—any
resulting injury can also be attributed to the school.184
3.

The Foreseeability Issue

Courts are also reluctant to hold that an injury inflicted upon a
disabled student by a peer was foreseeable.185 Generally, all a school
district must do is claim that it lacked actual or constructive notice of

180
181

See infra notes 181–84 (discussing proximate cause in cases of peer-inflicted injuries).
Sacks & Salem, supra note 64, at 188–89; Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at

690.
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 687–88 (noting the difficulty in
anticipating actions by third parties).
183
See id. at 690 (“[W]hile a school may have been derelict in its duty to supervise the
children in its care, the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury will generally be attributed
completely or in large measure to the student or students who actually attacked the
plaintiff.”).
184
See Mawdsley, supra note 67 at 359 (explaining that if a disabled student has an IEP,
the school has specific knowledge of that student’s needs and behaviors). This additional
information could make it easier for victims to argue that the school possessed actual
knowledge of the student’s condition and limitations, and thus Mawdsley questions
whether the school should have taken greater steps to ensure that student’s safety. Id. at
364, 386.
185
Weddle discusses this reality when he states that
[w]hen victims attempt to hold schools accountable for failing to
protect them from peer-on-peer abuse, courts routinely hold that,
under theories of negligent supervision, the bullying and associated
attacks and injuries were simply unforeseeable to the school officials
who could have intervened, even though education research has
repeatedly demonstrated that such abuse is occurring in virtually
every school setting.
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Marshall v.
Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that
the murder of a special education student on school grounds was not reasonably
foreseeable).
182
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such harm and they are free from liability.186 It is clear, however, that
injuries to students with disabilities on school grounds are not only
foreseeable but are in fact obvious.187 Studies show that nearly all
students with disabilities are subject to harassment by their peers.188
Additionally, any special education teacher can attest that instructing
special education students is difficult, requiring teachers to be constantly
vigilant to ensure that they adequately supervise these students in order
to provide a safe learning environment.189 The reality is that disabled
students are “special” and have unique relationships with their teachers
and schools because they are wholly dependent on attentive and
meticulous aid.190 The safety of disabled students depends in large part
on schools placing them in a safe environment with adequate
supervision; therefore, it is reasonable to find injuries to disabled
students foreseeable when supervision is lacking.191 Courts’ rigid
adherence to this idea that such harm is not foreseeable often leads to
decisions that appear to defy common sense.192 But when the law takes

See Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 387 (“[C]ourts usually will not
find [the school liable] unless school officials were aware of a specific threat and did
nothing to prevent injury or school officials were simply absent altogether from an area
where supervision was required.”).
187
See Earhart, supra note 71, at 29 (noting that several school districts and state
legislatures have responded with policies and legislation that acknowledge that “not only
is bullying a foreseeable problem, it is so prevalent and inevitable that district-wide policies
and state-wide legislation are needed to address it”). Earhart also questions why, in light
of all of these policies and legislation, courts still continue to cite lack of foreseeability as a
justification in ruling in favor of schools. Id.; see also Carlson, Flannery, & Kral, supra note
48 (concluding that disabled students are bullied significantly more than children in
regular education programs); Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 359 (reiterating that schools have
knowledge of a student’s vulnerabilities if such information is listed in the student’s IEP);
Weddle, Brutality and Blindness, supra note 64, at 643 (explaining that the educational
community knows that such abuse is taking place on school grounds).
188
Campaign Information, supra note 48; see also supra Part II.A (discussing how students
with disabilities are easy targets for peer-inflicted injuries).
189
Smith Telephone Interview, supra note 49; see also Mawdsley, supra note 67, at 361
(explaining that the difficulty of supervising disabled students is compounded by the
IDEA’s LRE requirement that a disabled student be educated, “[t]o the maximum extent
appropriate,” with regular education students) (alteration in original).
190
Lambert, supra note 40, at 569.
191
See id. (comparing a disabled student with a preschooler, as both lack skills and
knowledge to protect themselves and need placement in a safe environment where they
will be closely supervised). “As the age of the student (either chronological or
developmental) decreases, the [school’s] duty to protect” should increase. Id. at 571.
192
See, e.g., Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y.
1999) (finding the school not liable under the theory of negligent supervision for the death
of a special education student that occurred during lunch); Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch.
Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the victim did not have a viable claim of
negligence against the school); see also Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 643
186
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into account the unique situation of special education students and
issues of peer-inflicted injury, it gives victims a real chance to seek some
sort of remedy.193
B. A Critique of the Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Causes of Action Under
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1.

The Search for a Special Relationship

As a result of DeShaney, most courts, citing a lack of special
relationship between a school and a student, have refused to recognize a
cause of action under § 1983 for any injuries or harms inflicted upon a
child by a fellow student.194 There are three commonly cited policy
reasons in support of the courts’ rejection of a special relationship
between a disabled student and the school.195 First, refusing to find a
special relationship allows legislative bodies to decide whether liability
should be imposed.196 The state should have a choice as to whether it
desires to create liability; the decision should not be forced on them by a
court decision.197 Because the state created the educational system to
satisfy the needs of the community, it should therefore also decide what
level of risk is appropriate in public schools.198 Second, creating liability
through finding a special relationship would help relatively few
individuals while also opening the door to unnecessary suits in the

(noting that victims often fail in attempts to hold schools accountable for acts of negligence
that lead to injury).
193
See, e.g., Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 278 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (holding the school liable, as students with special needs are uniquely vulnerable to
threats by their peers); M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 685–
86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the school liable under negligent supervision, as it is
reasonably foreseeable that another student would harm a special education student).
194
See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that the victim’s § 1983 claim was not viable); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim failed); see also Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (noting that victims rarely
meet the exacting DeShaney standard, emphasizing the gross ineffectiveness of the statecreated danger exception to the standard); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 663
(noting that victims bringing a § 1983 claim face a “tough road in demonstrating that a
constitutional violation by the school flows from a tort committed by a fellow
student . . . [and that] most cannot clear the substantial doctrinal hurdles courts have
placed in the path of those seeking to hold state actors liable for injuries”).
195
See Phillips, supra note 37, at 262–63 (explaining the underlying policy reasons against
a special relationship).
196
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Phillips,
supra note 37, at 262.
197
Phillips, supra note 37, at 262; see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
198
Phillips, supra note 37, at 262.
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already overcrowded court system.199 Finally, substantial damage
awards under § 1983 take money out of the education system and drain
the already limited amount of funds available for public education in the
state.200
Nevertheless, “fears that recognizing [a special relationship] will
cause excessive litigation, unwarranted awards, and rising insurance
premiums” are unfounded.201 Concluding that a special relationship
exists would only help the victim prove that the school official was
acting “under color of law.”202 The victim must still prove causation.203
Even if such fears were legitimate, however, it would be more harmful to
society to allow disabled students to be subjected to continued rape,
molestation, and severe abuse in school than to hold a school that failed
to adequately supervise liable for a disabled student’s injuries.204
Additionally, a school’s failure to recognize the student’s injuries can
compound the emotional impact for the disabled student.205 Legal
remedies should be available to victims in instances where the school
fails to protect its disabled students from harm.206
Furthermore, many courts continually reject the special relationship
doctrine on the premise that schools do not completely restrict the
freedom of their students and that students will eventually have the
opportunity to seek some sort of help outside of the schoolhouse gates.207

199
Id. Recognizing a § 1983 claim may only help a few victims because the threshold of
proof is very high. Id. Furthermore, as § 1983 allows for an award of attorneys’ fees
pursuant to § 1988, it gives lawyers an incentive to bring more § 1983 claims. Id.
200
Id.
201
Davis, supra note 41, at 1162 (arguing in the context of sexual harassment claims
against public schools for discrimination based on gender); see also Phillips, supra note 37, at
258 (“[I]n contrast to public perception, creating a special relationship will not produce a
myriad of large civil awards against the schools.”).
202
Phillips, supra note 37, at 258.
203
Id.
204
Cf. Davis, supra note 41, at 1163 (making the same argument regarding the issue of
sexual harassment in schools).
205
See Bodensteiner, supra note 39, at 4 (explaining the educational and emotional impact
harassment can have on students); Davis, supra note 41, at 1163 (reiterating the devastating
effects of harassment, particularly when the school fails to acknowledge that the student
has been injured).
206
See Lambert, supra note 40, at 571 (stating that most commentators, unlike the majority
of courts to consider the issue, favor placing a constitutional duty on schools and school
officials); see also infra Part IV (proposing that courts deem injuries inflicted by peers on
disabled students as foreseeable so that these victims have a remedy against these abuses).
207
See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732–34 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
the fact that a child must attend public school does not make a child’s guardian incapable
of caring for the child’s fundamental needs); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that there was no
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Still, when a victim is in the school’s custody, her freedom to seek help
from abuse is completely restricted.208 It is also difficult to establish that
there is no way she could have protected herself without affirmative
action by the school.209
Most importantly, critics of the special relationship doctrine ignore
the unique reality faced by disabled students who, unlike their regular
education counterparts, may be restricted in their ability to obtain help
due to limitations imposed by their disabilities.210 Students with
disabilities may lack the basic understanding and communication skills
of a normal child, which in turn can prevent a student from obtaining
help, even once she returns home.211 For example, the student may not
understand that the injury inflicted is wrong.212 Also, even if the
disabled child knows that the injury is wrong, she may be unable to
successfully communicate it to an adult.213 Because of this unique
situation, the safety of students with disabilities depends in large part on
schools placing them in a safe environment and protecting them from
third-party harm.214
Furthermore, the theory that no special relationship exists between a
student and a school essentially assumes a child is left without

custodial or special relationship created because the parents, not the state, remained the
student’s primary caretaker).
208
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666 (reiterating that a student is
unable to leave school during school hours and thus is restricted from seeking help).
209
See id. at 664 (explaining the weakness of the custodial relationship approach).
Weddle explains that
[t]he Achilles heel of the custodial relationship approach is that the
school must have so limited the victim’s freedom to seek help that he
could not protect himself from his attacker without the affirmative
intervention of the school[, and that] the victim must show that he was
so cut off from outside aid that there was no one in the victim’s life
that he could turn to for aid other than school officials themselves.
Id.
210
See Lambert, supra note 40, at 569 (comparing a disabled student with a preschooler, as
both lack skills and knowledge to protect themselves and need placement in a safe
environment where they will be closely supervised).
211
See id. at 570 (“Children with developmental delays often lack the communication
skills necessary to avail themselves of parental assistance.”).
212
See id. at 570–71 (emphasizing that parents of special needs students rely on schools to
keep their children safe and to be their “eyes and ears” to alert them of wrongdoing in the
school).
213
See id. at 571 (reiterating that a student with disabilities may lack communication
skills).
214
See id. at 569 (asserting that injuries to developmentally delayed or disabled students
at school are foreseeable given their unique position and that these students are often
completely dependent on their educators).
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protection while in school.215 Yet, this reasoning is questionable as a
result of recent Supreme Court decisions such as Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.216 In Vernonia, the Court emphasized the nature of a
school’s custodial power and its need to closely supervise students in
order to justify a school’s drug testing policy.217 The Court specifically
stated that, for many purposes, school authorities act with in loco parentis
authority and, as a result, have a “duty to ‘inculcate the habits and
manners of civility.’”218 Likewise, in Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Supreme Court
again relied on the substantial need to protect students from the harms
of childhood drug use in order to justify a drug testing policy.219 It is
difficult to reconcile the differences between the Supreme Court’s
holdings in school drug testing cases—which are supported by the need
to protect children from drug use—with the Supreme Court’s holding in
DeShaney and its application in cases of peer-inflicted injury—where
courts refuse to find that schools have a duty to protect students.220
Finally, the courts’ refusal to find a special relationship is difficult to
reconcile with a proposed final draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
asserting that a special relationship exists between a school and its
students, giving rise to a duty of reasonable care.221 Therefore, the
215
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666 (noting that if the school decides
not to act, the child is essentially left without a remedy and must remain in school where he
is subject to torment and the parents can do nothing about it). But see Mawdsley, supra note
67, at 388 (explaining that, with the presence of an IEP, a disabled student does have some
limited protection available while at school). However, this level of protection could be
limited to the standard of care the school delineated in an IEP. Id.
216
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (upholding a school drug
testing policy). While considering the Fourth Amendment issue involved, the Vernonia
Court noted that it could not “disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility
for children.” Id. at 656. As such, it appears that the Supreme Court is more inclined to
protect students from drug use than it is to protect students from physical abuse of others.
See id.; see also supra note 102 (comparing a state’s duty under DeShaney with drug testing
jurisprudence).
217
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
218
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)). Nonetheless,
the Court appears to limit application of the terms “habits” and “manners of civility” to the
context of drugs and speech and would not extend it to the context of preventing students
from injuring fellow students. See id.
219
536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
220
Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)
(holding that the state had no constitutional duty to protect), with Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655
(emphasizing the custodial powers of a school and the requirement of supervision that is
necessary in order to create a proper educational environment).
221
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 40(a)–(b)(5) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005). The
Restatement suggests that a school is in a special relationship with its students and owes its
students a duty of reasonable care. See supra notes 66, 68 (discussing the Restatement’s
finding of a special relationship).
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assumption by the courts that no special relationship exists between
students and school officials is inconsistent with certain legal precedent,
secondary authorities, and research.222 On a related note, it also leads to
many victims being left without an effective cause of action.223
2.

The Difficulty of Establishing a State-Created Danger

Victims additionally attempt to argue that the school created or
enhanced the risk of harm, thus falling within the purview of the statecreated danger exception.224 Most courts deny claims under this theory
and refuse to hold schools accountable unless the school or school
official participated in some sort of affirmative act that increased or
enhanced the danger to the student; simple inaction or failure to act is
generally insufficient.225 Many harsh decisions have resulted, drawing
the criticism of commentators who suggest that these decisions do
nothing to encourage a school to implement positive changes.226 Rather,
under the present standard, a school that is aware of abuse yet does not
take any active role in stopping or preventing it is not liable so long as

222
See supra Part II.B.2 (reiterating the legal precedent, secondary authorities, and
research that address § 1983 causes of action).
223
See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the premise that the school could be held liable under § 1983).
Although the victim alleged that the teacher could have been able to prevent such acts of
abuse from taking place, the court rejected that the teacher had any duty to do so. Id. at
1371–72. Disabled children and their parents are in a difficult situation as Weddle depicts:
While there is something disturbing about the fact that the state
can compel children to attend school yet not incur a duty to protect
them from their peers, the Court’s approach actually makes a good
deal of constitutional sense. . . .
On the other hand, such a formulation ignores the significant
disability placed upon school children . . . [as they] must remain in the
school where the torment is carried out, and the parents can do
nothing to shield [them] from the torment.
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 666.
224
See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1993) (arguing that
the state created or enhanced the danger).
225
See Teague v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 185 F. App’x 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2006)
(asserting that there was no state-created danger present in the case as the school did not
have actual knowledge of attacks and did not disregard such knowledge at the excessive
risk to the victim); see also Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (noting that it is
difficult to hold schools accountable, as “courts have been unwilling to view the inaction as
a danger-enhancing affirmative act absent deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s plight”).
226
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (commenting that victims are
rarely successful in persuading the courts that “the conduct of school officials in the face of
severe bullying has been so shocking that the state could be characterized as having created
or enhanced the danger”).
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such actions do not shock the conscience of the court.227 Even in cases
where students were left unsupervised, courts have refused to hold the
school accountable for negligence under the state-created danger theory,
reducing the theory to simply “that one comment toward the end of the
DeShaney opinion.”228
As a result of this reasoning, schools are free to continue acting
deliberately indifferent to a disabled student’s plight without fear of
repercussions under § 1983.229 A victim bringing a § 1983 claim will find
it very difficult to establish a special relationship or prove that the state
created the danger.230 Despite the substantial authority suggesting that
schools do maintain a special relationship with its students, courts are
still reluctant to hold schools responsible and generally will refuse a
victim’s § 1983 claim.231
C. The Costs and Benefits of Actions Under Title IX of the Educational
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act
Initially, the most obvious bar to a vast number of claims under Title
IX is the requirement that there be some type of sexual element to the
injury.232 This is because Title IX applies only to discrimination based on
sex.233 Therefore, Title IX is likely an ineffective remedy in many cases
from the outset because the harassment tends not to be based on gender,
but rather on disability.234 Still, the fact that a Title IX cause of action is
See Oren, supra note 109, at 49 (suggesting that it is difficult to shock the judicial
conscience); Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 670 (“[T]he trend has been for
courts to reject [the state-created danger exception] even in the face of seemingly egregious
conduct on the part of school officials.”). But see Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist., 53 F.
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding the school liable under the theory of state-created
danger even though most courts reject this theory).
228
Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 734.
229
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 667 (noting the lack of success in
bringing a § 1983 claim).
230
See supra Part II.B.2 (reviewing the current § 1983 jurisprudence).
231
See supra Part II.B.2.a (analyzing the special relationship exception to the DeShaney
rule).
232
See supra text accompanying note 141 (quoting Title IX codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2006)).
233
But see Secunda, supra note 140, at 5 (noting that although most courts have not
evaluated the complex legal issues surrounding students with disabilities who are subject
to harassment, “when another student bullies a special education child based on that
child’s appearance, behavior, or failure to live up to stereotyped notions of gender, it is
necessary to consider the intersection between Title IX and . . . the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).”).
234
See Conn, supra note 40, at 791–92 (noting that the harassment must contain a sexual
element or gender-basis to fall under Title IX).
227
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limited to gender harassment makes a good deal of sense.235 Title IX was
not intended to serve as a remedy for injuries inflicted on disabled
students by peers, although many victims have tried to use it as such.236
Another barrier to Title IX claims is the deliberate indifference
standard articulated in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of
Education.237 The deliberate indifference standard is favorable for school
districts because it focuses on specific instances of known harassment
rather than anticipating future acts of third parties.238 It is based upon
the premise that recipients of federal funds should only be held liable for
their own actions, not the actions of third parties.239 Still, because Title IX
does not place an affirmative duty on behalf of the school to anticipate
harassment or injuries inflicted by peers, it does not force schools or
school officials to prevent such behavior in the first place.240 To avoid
being charged with deliberate indifference, it is not even necessary for a
school to stop the harassment—all a school must do is simply investigate
the alleged incident and it can defeat the victim’s claim.241
Similarly, some believed that the IDEA would provide students with
disabilities a way of remedying harms inflicted by peers in school.242
Nevertheless, in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a school is only liable for
violation of the IDEA when actions by school officials rise to such a level
so as to deny any meaningful benefit of education.243 This standard is
justified by the fact that the main purpose of the IDEA was only to
provide access to educational opportunities for students with disabilities;
nothing more, and nothing less.244 Given the time period in which
235
See generally Stuart, supra note 140, at 245–47 (providing an overview of Title IX and
related jurisprudence).
236
See, e.g., Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1124
(10th Cir. 2008) (denying a victim’s Title IX claim).
237
526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999); see also Ferster, supra note 40, at 195 (reiterating that the
success rate for Title IX claims is very low because of the deliberate indifference standard).
238
Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 661.
239
Davis, 526 U.S. at 640–41.
240
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 660 (explaining that the Davis
deliberate indifference standard offers little motivation for schools or school officials to be
proactive in preventing any harassment or injuries to students).
241
See, e.g., Rost, 511 F.3d at 1121 (concluding that the principal’s investigation was
sufficient to defeat the claim of deliberate indifference).
242
See generally Ferster, supra note 40, at 212–17 (outlining the FAPE standard under the
IDEA).
243
458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982).
244
Ferster, supra note 40, at 207; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3) (2006) (“[T]his chapter has
been successful in ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children
access to a free appropriate public education and in improving educational results for
children with disabilities.”).
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Congress passed the IDEA and the Supreme Court decided Rowley, the
goal of simply providing educational access to disabled students made
sense.245 With only half of the over eight million children with
disabilities receiving appropriate educational services and over one
million disabled children being excluded from education altogether,
simply getting children with disabilities in schools was an
accomplishment at the time.246 Now, however, the framework under
which the Court decided Rowley is outdated and “inconsistent with the
modern view of special education.”247 As a result of the low standard
that courts require a school to meet, causes of action under the IDEA
frequently fail.248
Causes of action under the IDEA, however, may be an appealing
standard for the courts to apply because of the remedies involved,
despite the fact that several claims under the IDEA have failed.249
Causes of action under § 1983 or Title IX have the potential to result in
large monetary damage awards, whereas remedies under the IDEA are
limited to tuition reimbursement or compensatory education.250 As such,
allowing for such claims to proceed could remedy situations in which
plaintiffs do not need or desire money damages.251 Still, given the pain
and humiliation disabled victims often face in cases of peer-inflicted
abuse, this remedy is less than desirable for the victim.252
Therefore, as demonstrated in this Part, there are some strengths and
many weaknesses in the courts’ analyses of claims brought by disabled
students for harms inflicted by peers.253 Bringing claims under the
previously discussed causes of action leaves many victims without relief
and many schools without any sense of accountability.254 Refusing to
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Ferster, supra note 40, at 213.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189; Ferster, supra note 40, at 213.
247
Ferster, supra note 40, at 213.
248
See, e.g., R.P. ex rel. K.P. v. Springdale Sch. Dist., No. 06-5014, 2007 WL 552117, at *4
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2007) (failing to hold a school liable for a violation of the IDEA).
249
See Ferster, supra note 40, at 228 (suggesting that the IDEA is a superior remedy, as
“students with legitimate claims can find relief as IDEA intended, by attending school free
from harassment and gaining a meaningful benefit from their education”).
250
See id. at 227 (asserting that because the stakes are lower for the schools involved than
in claims pursuant to § 1983 or Title IX, there is “no need to apply a strict deliberate
indifference standard to protect schools from devastating liability”).
251
See id. at 225 (acknowledging that the current trend among courts is to deny claims
under the IDEA).
252
Id.
253
See supra Part III (analyzing the flaws in bringing claims under various causes of
action).
254
See supra Part III (discussing the strengths and weakness of the traditional legal
remedies available to students who are victims of peer-inflicted injuries, and how, in many
cases, schools and school officials are able to completely escape liability).
245
246
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find schools liable for failure to supervise disabled students and prevent
foreseeable peer-inflicted injuries is unjustified, yet this is typically the
result due to our current legal framework.255 It is apparent, however,
that the cause of action with the greatest likelihood of success is the
theory of negligent supervision.256 Still, even the theory of negligent
supervision in its current state has its flaws.257
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Children with disabilities are suffering from injuries inflicted by
their peers while they are in the custody of and under the supervision of
school officials.258 It is all too often the case that school officials who
know or have reason to know of abuse either turn a blind eye to the
violence or react in a manner that encourages such behavior.259 Schools
and school officials who allow awful acts of abuse to occur are generally
able to escape liability from suit, leaving the student victims without any
remedy.260 Therefore, the current legal theories remain inadequate and
are in need of change.261 The very welfare of our nation’s students
depends on it.262 Schools and school officials must be held accountable
for failing to adequately supervise their students. Knowing that there
will be consequences for allowing acts of peer-inflicted abuse to occur
will provide schools with the necessary incentive to remedy the
situation.263 Without such an incentive, there is little likelihood that any
school would be motivated to change.
There is hope evidenced by the small number of victims who have
recently prevailed under theories of negligent supervision in courts that

255
See supra Part III (commenting on the reasoning of several courts’ decisions regarding
peer-inflicted injuries).
256
See supra Part III.A (discussing the theory of negligent supervision).
257
See supra Part III.A (critiquing the theory of negligent supervision and noting its
flaws).
258
See Weddle, Brutality & Blindness, supra note 64, at 395 (“[C]ourts should state very
plainly and directly that school officials already know or should know that bullying is
prevalent in every [sic] virtually every school . . . .”); see also supra Part II.A (commenting on
how children with disabilities are disproportionately subjected to abuse by their peers
while in school).
259
See supra Part II.B (exploring various cases in which schools and school officials have
failed to effectively intervene and prevent abuse inflicted by peers upon students with
disabilities).
260
See supra Part III (analyzing the current legal theories utilized by victims).
261
See supra Part III (establishing the general ineffectiveness of the current legal theories).
262
Dolan, supra note 37, at 216.
263
See Weddle, Brutality & Blindness, supra note 64, at 391 (“The legal requirements
governing school officials’ duty to supervise their students need to be realigned to reflect
these realities about bullying, its prevalence, its effects, and its prevention.”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 8

786

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

recognize that harm inflicted upon special education students by their
peers is in fact foreseeable.264 Thus, this Part proposes that one method
of updating the way in which our legal system addresses the issue of
disabled students and peer-inflicted abuse is to build upon a theory of
negligent supervision, specifically taking into account the unique
situation of disabled students.265 First, Part IV.A proposes a model state
statute that recognizes that special education students stand in a special
relationship with schools and deems harms to special needs students by
their peers foreseeable.266 Accordingly, courts should take notice of, and
begin to implement, the proposed statute, which utilizes the approach
adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the California Court of
Appeals.267 In addition, Part IV.B recommends a model jury instruction
for courts to use in establishing a presumption of a school’s duty to
supervise students with disabilities.268 By applying both the proposed
statute and proposed jury instruction regarding the presumption, our
legal system will take into account the unique situation of students with
disabilities and can hold schools accountable for negligence.
A. Adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts and California Approach to
Theories of Negligent Supervision and Children with Disabilities
First, courts throughout the nation must acknowledge reality and
take notice of the fact that students with disabilities are often the targets
of injuries and victimization by their fellow students.269 With studies
demonstrating that eight out of ten students with disabilities are subject
to abuse or harassment, a court’s conclusion that such acts of abuse are
unforeseeable defies logic.270 Students are entrusted to a school’s care
and peer-inflicted injuries occur while the victim is under a school’s
watch. States should adopt the subsequent model statute, which applies
the reasoning of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and California
264
See supra Part III.A.3 (examining cases discussing the foreseeability of harm to
students with disabilities).
265
See infra Part IV (proposing that courts should view the infliction of injury on special
education students by their peers as foreseeable).
266
See infra Part IV.A (outlining a model state statute establishing the presumption of
foreseeability)
267
See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that courts adopt a method of reasoning similar to the
California Court of Appeals and congruent with the Restatement (Third) of Torts regarding
foreseeability of peer-inflicted injuries upon children with disabilities).
268
See infra Part IV.B (presenting a model jury instruction that explains the presumption
of foreseeability defined in the model state statute).
269
See supra Part II.A (commenting on how children with disabilities are
disproportionately subject to abuse by their peers while in school).
270
See supra Part II.A (exploring studies and statistics confirming that harm to students
with disabilities is unfortunately very common in schools).
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appellate courts and mandates that schools have a special relationship
with disabled students; therefore, injuries to special education students
are foreseeable.
Proposed State Statute: Special Relationship Between School
and Disabled Student
Any public educational institution in this state
stands in a special relationship with all special needs
students who attend the institution. A special needs
child is one who suffers from a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities including but not limited to walking,
talking, sleeping, eating, and working. The child must
be diagnosed by a doctor or mental health professional
and the school must have record of the disability.
A school with knowledge that the child is disabled,
particularly where the school provides specialized
education or instruction, stands in a special relationship
with the student and has a heightened duty to protect
the student from all foreseeable injuries. It is foreseeable
that a disabled student may be harmed by himself or
peers without adequate supervision. Schools should
provide every special needs classroom with a classroom
aide and should restrict the ratio of disabled students to
adults accordingly. If a disabled student is injured at
school, it is presumed that the school is liable for breach
of its special duty of care.
Exclusion:
A school will not be liable to a disabled student
under the special relationship standard where the school
has provided adequate supervision and taken all
reasonably necessary precautions.
The following
factors, taken alone or together, may demonstrate that
the school should not be liable. The following factors
are not exclusive:
1) The school restricted the number of special needs
students per teacher, per classroom;
2) The special needs classroom was equipped with
an aide;
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3) A school maintained a policy mandating that an
adult must always accompany a special needs student
on school grounds; and
4) Teachers were provided sensitivity training,
specifically targeting peer-on-peer abuse.
Commentary
The proposed state statute establishes that students with disabilities
fall within the special relationship standard of care set forth in
DeShaney.271 This statute mandates that the special relationship between
schools and disabled students creates a foreseeable risk of harm;
therefore, schools will be presumed liable for peer-on-peer abuse that
occurs at school. By adopting this statute, states will clarify to schools
and their officials the duties they owe to disabled students.
The
proposed statute’s reasoning and rule are supported by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, cases arising out of the California Court of Appeals, and
many additional authorities.272
A school must fully appreciate “the dangers posed by failing to
adequately supervise its students, particularly special education
“When a school district instructs special education
students.”273
[students], it takes on the unique responsibilities associated with this
instruction and the special needs of these children.”274 Thus, the school
must understand that there is a foreseeabilty of harm to these particular
students. As such, schools have a duty to disabled students based on
“the foreseeability of harm to special education students, the well-settled
statutory duty of school districts to take all reasonable steps to protect
them . . . and the paramount policy concern of providing our children
A disabled student cannot
with safe learning environments.”275
reasonably be expected to care for himself at all times; instead, the
disabled student relies on the school for protection.276
The statute proposed above provides schools with “an incentive to
drive compliance with the duty to provide adequate supervision.”277
School districts that are faced with the prospect of liability for failure to
271
See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text (discussing the DeShaney special
relationship standard).
272
See supra notes 68, 80–84 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that
schools have a duty to protect disabled students from harm).
273
M.W. v. Pan. Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 675 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
274
Id. at 682.
275
Id. at 683.
276
Jennifer C. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
277
Id. at 282.
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supervise their students will take more precautionary measures
designed to limit their liability, thus increasing the level of safety for
students. The proposed statute does not seek to hold all schools liable or
to allow frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, the exception provides model
factors that schools can use to defeat the presumption of liability. States
should adopt the proposed statute because (1) it benefits disabled
students by providing them with a remedy for foreseeable injuries that
occur at school; (2) it establishes a heightened duty that schools owe to
disabled students; and (3) it provides schools with an incentive to take
precautionary steps to fulfill their heightened duty. Furthermore, the
proposed statute allows schools to escape liability if the school has taken
steps to provide adequate supervision. Given its fairness to and benefit
for all parties, states should adopt the proposed statute.
B. Children with Disabilities and Peer-Inflicted Injury: A Presumption of
Duty and Foreseeabilty
Alternatively, courts should recognize a presumption that schools
have a duty to supervise students with disabilities and that it is
reasonably foreseeable for a student with a disability to be injured by a
peer, absent such supervision. Such a presumption would ensure that
schools effectively deal with the issue of children with disabilities and
peer-inflicted injuries, even if states refuse to adopt the aforementioned
proposed statute. Furthermore, presumptions of duty and foreseeability
will provide victims a way to hold schools accountable because it closes
the primary door through which school officials so often escape. No
longer could a school defend against liability by asserting that it lacked
actual or constructive notice of the harm. 278 As a result, victims would
have an adequate remedy. A model presumption that could be
incorporated into jury instructions follows:
Presumption of Duty and Foreseeability for Injuries Inflicted
upon Students with Disabilities
1. Defendant, a school, has a duty to adequately
supervise students with disabilities in its charge. This
duty requires a degree of reasonable care applicable to
circumstances; in the case of a student with a disability,
the circumstances require a higher degree of care due to
the heightened responsibilities associated with
educating a student with disabilities.
278
See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing how the requirement of foreseeabilty acts as a bar to
valid claims of negligent supervision).
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2. Defendant, a school, as a custodian of a student with
disabilities, is also charged with the knowledge that
students with disabilities face a general risk of harm
from their peers, and, as such, any resulting peerinflicted injuries will be deemed foreseeable. This
presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the act
of a third party was a truly intervening cause and no
degree of supervision could reasonably have prevented
the injury.
3. A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence and
denial of foreseeability does not serve as a defense.
Commentary
This presumption assumes that schools know what research has
already established—students in general are at risk of peer-inflicted
injuries and students with disabilities are disproportionately subject to
such injuries.279 This presumption would finally hold the schools
The
accountable for failure to adequately supervise students.280
proposed presumption could be used under a negligent supervision
claim or a § 1983 claim. If courts apply both this proposed presumption
and states enact the proposed state statute for negligent supervision,
legal theory will finally reflect the reality of the situation and provide
victims with much needed relief. It is essential that courts understand
that, given the circumstances, schools have an enhanced duty when
dealing with these students and injuries to special education students are
foreseeable.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the current legal structure, Renee Soper, the victim from Part I
of this Note, was unable to hold her school liable for its negligence.281
279
See Weddle, Bullying in Schools, supra note 53, at 701 (“Research has demonstrated that
bullying exists in nearly every school setting and that the most potent indicator of its
prevalence and strength is the leadership of the administration and staff of the school.”).
280
See id. (“It is therefore neither fair nor rational to exempt school officials from a duty
to prevent bullying, and it is neither truthful nor logical to ignore the causal connection
between the failure to supervise children and the likelihood they will bully and injure each
other.”); see also supra Part II.A (noting that students with disabilities are disproportionately
subject to peer-inflicted injuries).
281
See Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part I
(introducing Renee and her story).
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Even though the school had prior notice of Renee’s encounter with
Brandon, and even though Ms. Soper had repeatedly informed the
school of the potential for an attack, the school refused to remedy the
situation and an assault occurred. Renee was left without a remedy and
the school was left free of liability.
Fortunately, if states utilize both of the proposed solutions set forth
in this Note, victims like Renee will stand a chance of holding schools
liable for negligence. If the state legislatures take into account the unique
situation of special education students in schools and understand that
harm to special education students is in fact foreseeable, victims like
Renee will have a stronger likelihood of prevailing and recovering
something for the unbearable injury they suffered. Furthermore, if
courts begin to recognize a presumption of foreseeabilty of harm to
children with disabilities in the context of peer-inflicted injuries, victims
like Renee will no longer bear such a heavy burden of proof. Schools
will be unable to rest on the argument that the injury was not
foreseeable, but rather will have a duty to protect students with
disabilities.
Schools and school officials must be held accountable for failing to
adequately supervise their students. By imposing liability on schools for
allowing acts of peer-inflicted abuse to occur on campus, the courts will
provide schools with the necessary incentive to remedy the situation.
Under the new proposed framework, schools will be put on notice that
they could in fact be held liable for failing to adequately supervise
special education students in their charge. Consequently, they hopefully
will increase the level of safety and protection they provide for their
students.
Brittany Smith*

*
J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2011); B.S., Business
Administration, Elmhurst College (2008). I would like to thank my family and friends for
all of their support. I would also like to give special thanks to Professor Stuart and Tara
Waterlander for all of their guidance and helpful comments throughout the writing
process.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

